Modern Library

(2004) My opponent in this debate, Chris McHugh (CM), apparently has three main objections to the argument from nonbelief (ANB), which is the argument that I presented in my opening statement. They are: (1) the expectations defense, (2) his claim that ANB’s premise (A3) is unsupported, and (3) a version of what I have called […]

(2004) This second rebuttal will show that Drange’s critique of my opening statement offers no sound refutation of any of the arguments presented there. Drange’s debate tactic appears to be relegated to pleading a lack of understanding of my opening arguments. This is surprising, for most of the points made in my opening statement are […]

I argue that Pardi’s criticisms of Drange’s version of the argument from nonbelief (ANB) do not refute ANB, although they may or may not require peripheral corrections or clarifications on Drange’s part. I focus not so much on Drange’s formulation, but on what I take to be the central intuitions of ANB and on the inadequacy of Pardi’s objections. I assume some familiarity with Pardi’s paper and with ANB, although I present what I consider to be ANB’s central claims.

In this third paper about the kalam cosmological argument (KCA), Guminski shows how William Lane Craig has developed a mutated form of the argument such that it presupposes the metaphysical possibility of an infinite temporal series of finite duration. The Kalam Cosmological Argument As Amended (KCAAA) thus contradicts a key component of the KCA: that any infinite temporal series is metaphysically impossible. The KCAAA relies upon the Standard Big Bang Model as providing the supposed factual basis for concluding that the universe has a finite but indefinite past, thus involving an infinite temporal series of finite duration. Guminski argues why there is good reason to hold that any infinite temporal series of finite duration is metaphysically impossible given the A-theory of time, absolute simultaneity, and some complementary doctrines--assumptions that Craig accepts. Given these assumptions, however, the KCAAA fails.

According to a form of the kalam cosmological argument expounded by William Lane Craig, there cannot be a beginningless temporal world because the application of Cantorian set theory of transfinite arithmetic to the real world generates counterintuitive absurdities, thereby disclosing that an infinite set of real entities is metaphysically impossible. This article shows how this is not the case by pursuing a novel approach wherein it is understood that an infinite set of real entities is not a set, considered as a technical term of art, within the meaning of Cantorian theory. Upon accepting the original version for publication, Quentin Smith, then editor of Philo, wrote: "Your paper has been studied thoroughly for some time and there is agreement that it is at least an undercutting defeater of [William Lane] Craig's beliefs about real infinites, probably even an overriding defeater. More importantly, it introduces a novel metaphysical theory of the relation of transfinite arithmetic to concrete reality." Guminski's persuasive challenge to Craig's account of why Cantorian transfinite arithmetic should not be deemed to apply to the world of concrete entities has yet to be answered by Craig. The world wonders.

Some Christian philosophers and apologists have vigorously mounted a moral argument for God's existence made apart from the standard nonmoral grounds. The moral argument is based upon the idea of natural moral law (fundamental moral principles and norms apprehended as such by persons of good will as universally binding and not based upon supernatural revelation or divine positive law). In this expanded version of a talk given to the University of Colorado Theology Forum, Arnold T. Guminski aims to show why those naturalists and theists who hold that the natural moral law obtains should conclude that the moral argument for the existence of God is unsound. Particular attention is given to the writings of J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Paul Copan.

In this essay Horia Plugaru argues that the existence of physiological horrors provides evidence against the existence of a traditional theistic God. Although the argument proceeds from the empirical observation of facts that shouldn't obtain in a theistic world, and horrors by definition bring us some sort of suffering, the argument is not a variation on the evidential argument from evil, though it is related to it. Rather, the argument is that unjustified and extreme ugliness is unlikely to be found in the work of a perfect creator, but since it is in fact found in the world, human beings are probably not the products of a perfect creator.

(2003) In his Opening Statement, Chris McHugh (hereafter CM) declared that he would defend two theses, that it is more reasonable to be a theist than a nontheist and that it is more reasonable to be a Christian than it is to reject Jesus Christ. That stated aim is different from CM’s originally stated aim. […]

(2003) In this first rebuttal, I argue that Drange’s ANB provides no evidence against the existence of the God of Christianity. Premise A of ANB states that if the God of Christianity (abbreviated GC) were to exist, then He would possess at least the following properties: being able to bring about situation S, all things […]

(2003) Jeffery Jay Lowder Michael Martin is the author of Atheism, Morality, and Meaning. I recently wrote a review of that book.[1] I concluded that although Martin’s book is a welcome addition to the literature on the relationship between atheism and morality, it does contain some significant shortcomings. In a recent essay, Martin responds to […]

Review of Michael Martin’s: Atheism, Morality, and Meaning (2003) (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 2002, 330 pages) Jeffery Jay Lowder What is the relationship between God and morality? Is morality dependent in some way on the existence of God? Arguments for an affirmative answer to that question may be classified into one of three categories: ontological, epistemological, […]

(2003) Tom Wanchick In a sampling of his Internet publications,[1] Prof. Michael Martin has argued that, when closely evaluated, the concept of Heaven as historically construed by Christians is found to be a veritable mare’s nest of philosophical difficulties and confusions. At best, the idea is implausible; at worst, it is incoherent. Among Dr. Martin’s […]

(2003) Richard Carrier Introduction The Event Basic Survey and Score Note on Debate Strategy First Point: “Argument from the Universe” Second Point: “Argument from Absolute Morality” Third Point: The “Trial” Defense vs. the Argument from Evil Fourth Point: Shoring Up Agnosticism Q & A: Pitching Balls for the Home Team Addendum on Muslim Apologetics Handout […]

(2003) Although Chris McHugh and I have discussed the argument from nonbelief (abbreviated ANB) in the past[1], and although he took it up recently as part of his Internet debate with Doug Krueger[2], I shall not presuppose any of that in this debate, but will present the argument from scratch. My position is that ANB […]

(2003) This opening statement will defend two theses; the first of these is that it is more reasonable to be a theist than a nontheist, and the second is that it is more reasonable to be a Christian than it is to reject Jesus Christ. In order to show that theism is more reasonable than […]

The "lost" Drange-McHugh debate on the existence of the God of evangelical Christianity was originally conducted in the Formal Debates & Discussions forum of the Internet Infidels Discussion Board (IIDB) from November 30, 2003 to May 15, 2004, and has been restored to the Secular Web proper so that it would once again be available to all on the world wide web.

The "lost" Drange-McHugh debate on the existence of the God of evangelical Christianity was originally conducted in the Formal Debates & Discussions forum of the Internet Infidels Discussion Board (IIDB) from November 30, 2003 to May 15, 2004, and has been restored to the Secular Web proper so that it would once again be available to all on the world wide web.

This is a rebuttal of Rea's claim that naturalism "is without rational foundation." This essay shows that adopting the "research program" of basic empiricism is universally appealing, and since naturalism as a "worldview" follows from adopting basic empiricism and applying it to the facts of the world, naturalism has a rational foundation. Rea's conclusion that naturalism must abandon materialism and realism about material objects and other minds because naturalism cannot "discover" intrinsic modal properties is also disproved.

(2003) Christopher McHugh Opening Statement by Christopher McHugh In this debate, I will present a case for theism, and offer refutations of any atheological arguments that Krueger adduces. In many past debates between theists and atheists, the theist philosopher has used a series of intuitively plausible arguments concerning cosmology, morality and history to construct a […]

The Krueger-McHugh Debate: Theism or Atheism (2003) Christopher McHugh First Rebuttal by Christopher McHugh In my opening statement, I defended a mystical concept of God that is very different from the one that Krueger has chosen to attack in his opening arguments. Consequently, I can concede Krueger’s opening statement in its entirety, and still maintain […]

"History shows that metaphysics is subjective, prevaricated to the extent of unintelligibility, and irrational; it is essentially ostentatious and philosophically so dense that it is inane. Likewise, many revelations are demonstrably and factually wrong. Both are anachronistic and have ceased to be inspiring sources of human knowledge. Any reliable human knowledge is empirical and scientific."

In Nonbelief and Evil, Theodore Drange presents what he calls the Argument from Nonbelief against the existence of God: the fact that not all people believe the gospel message before they die provides grounds for denying that the Christian God exists. Pardi contends, however, that there are good reasons to deny that this inference goes through; he argues that given the nature of free persons, it is not within the set of logically possible states of affairs that God is able to actualize. Further, Pardi contends that Drange has an inadequate understanding of religious belief that should be rejected and replaced with a more robust formulation.

The Cooke-Aijaz Debate: Closing Remarks from the Moderator (2003) Richard Carrier As moderator for the Cooke-Aijaz Debate I feel compelled to register my disappointment with both sides. Cooke’s approach was generally flippant and often insulting to his opponent, and to the religious generally. I would never recommend him for a debate again. Indeed, he largely […]

Theodore Drange responds to Guthrie's critique. Drange finds Guthrie's essay "unclear," and contends that Guthrie "erred in many ways," including "misstating my views in many ways (and continuing such misstatements even in his concluding paragraph), ... in trying to argue that God (were he to exist) is unable to reduce human suffering, and ... in his attempt to formulate a divine desire that conflicts with God's desire to reduce human suffering."

The Krueger-McHugh Debate: Theism or Atheism (2003) Doug Krueger First Rebuttal by Doug Krueger In this first rebuttal I will address some of the problems with McHugh’s argument for the existence of god. Subsequent posts will address his rebuttals to the arguments in my opening statement. McHugh has chosen as his sole weapon for his […]

Does God Exist? (2002) Imran Aijaz’s Closing Statement I find it rather surprising to see Dr. Cooke “wonder[ing] what value there is in thrashing out questions of the existence of God”. If a being like the God of classical theism does, in fact, exist, then man is part of a teleological worldview that is unfolding […]

Does God Exist? (2002) Opening Statement by Bill Cooke The Folly of the Super-dupers There is a beach at the northern extremity of New Zealand called the Ninety-Mile Beach. Oddly enough, the beach is ninety miles long. Imagine how many grains of sand there must be on this beach. Tens of millions? Now imagine one […]

Does God Exist? (2002) Bill Cooke’s First Rebuttal: Super Duper Defended…or Was It Hyper Mega? The opening statement of Mr Aijaz was a worthwhile, although unsuccessful, effort to retrieve some credibility for a cause long recognised as irrevocably lost by the vast majority of academics. But more than this, his arguments underscored the main point […]

Does God Exist? (2002) Bill Cooke’s Second Rebuttal: Super Duper’s (or Was It Hyper Mega’s) Last Gasp One really wonders what value there is in thrashing out questions of the existence of God. The evidence against the existence of any sort of god is so overwhelming as to be hardly worth arguing. And, as I […]

Does God Exist? (2002) Bill Cooke’s Closing Statement: Behold the new god! Anthropocentric conceit! Having lunged and parried in cyberspace on the question of the possible existence of a god, how far have we got? I doubt anyone’s mind has been changed significantly. All that has probably happened as a result of these exchanges is […]