William Lane Craig’s kalam cosmological argument maintains that the universe had a beginning. One of his arguments for this premise aims to show that a beginningless universe is metaphysically impossible, either because an actual infinite cannot exist because it would result in counterintuitive absurdities, or because time consists of a temporal series of events formed by successive addition, and that it’s not possible for any such series to be an actual infinite. In the first of two previous papers, Arnold T. Guminski presents his solution to the problem of counterintuitive absurdities, which he believes results from applying Cantorian theory to the real world. However, his alternative version of the application of Cantorian theory to the real world attempts to achieve by a priori methods what can only be accomplished a posteriori, raises the question of whether a set theory can be fully developed that is consistent with it, and addresses “counterintuitive absurdities” that are not absurdities at all. In his second paper, Guminski correctly argues that it’s possible for time to have no beginning by showing that the totality of all time need not be formed by successive addition, but this argument succeeds independently of his alternative version of the application of Cantorian theory to the real world, rendering it unnecessary.
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(2019) Stephen Nygaard IntroductionProbability ConceptsBayes’ TheoremLife-Friendly UniversesThe Main Theorem of IJWhy IJ is Not Very UsefulWhat FTA Needs to ShowOther Criticisms of IJ Vesa Palonen Luke BarnesThe Application of Probability to Robin Collins’ FTA The First Premise The Second Premise The Third Premise The Conclusion A Final ProblemConclusionAppendixNotes Introduction A paper written over twenty years ago by Michael Ikeda and Bill Jefferys […]