(2026)
Introduction
Miracles and Laws of Nature
The Failure of Inductivism
Signs, Wonders, and Miracles
Miracles of Cosmology
Miracles of Prophecy
Miracles of Experience
[This article is reprinted from the Trinity Journal of Natural & Philosophical Theology, Vol. 3 (Fall 2025) in collaboration with the Trinity Graduate School of Apologetics and Theology, with a response by John W. Loftus forthcoming in Vol. 4 (Fall 2026). The version presented here has been slightly modified in formatting. Used with permission.]
ABSTRACT: Objections to the veracity of miracle claims typically run something like this: even if we concede that miracles are logically possible, an event falling outside the bounds of the laws of nature (a miracle) is so outlandishly improbable, and human testimony supporting it so unreliable, that no amount of testimonial evidence is ever sufficient to justify a miracle claim. Given our knowledge of the laws of nature—fixed, observable regularities of the physical world—along with our understanding of probability and our familiarity with the vagaries of human nature, the only rational response to miracle claims is skepticism. Against that reasoning I will argue first that in light of the problem of induction and the incompleteness of our knowledge of nature’s perceived regularities, there are no grounds for believing in natural laws that are universally binding. For that reason, I will argue further, miracles are best understood as “signs” of divine activity that defy the expectations borne of human experience rather than events that run against, around or beyond the laws of nature (whatever those are supposed to be). Finally I will briefly describe three categories of miracles which do not invoke the testimony of witnesses and in which belief appears justified: (1) miracles of cosmology; (2) miracles of prophecy; and (3) miracles of experience.
Introduction
Miracles have fallen on hard times. For most of the history of the Christian church (or at least for its first 1,500 years or so), accounts of miracles featured prominently, not only in doctrine and practical exhortation, but in natural theology and apologetics. Numerous apologists—from Justin Martyr to Augustine to Thomas Aquinas—contended that the biblical narratives provided good evidence of God acting miraculously in the history of Israel and the church. Even after the Scientific Revolution and the Renaissance, natural philosophers of the seventeenth century like Isaac Newton and Robert Boyle vigorously defended miracle claims. As Harrison observes, “Leading scientists of this era, almost without exception, had a dual commitment on the one hand to a science premised upon a mechanical universe governed by immutable laws of nature and on the other to an omnipotent God who intervened in the natural order from time to time, breaching these ‘laws’ of nature.”[1]
That all began to change, however, with the further development of a naturalistic-scientific epistemology during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, and with the influential anti-miraculous arguments of David Hume in particular. Since the Enlightenment and yet more so into the twenty-first century, serious talk of miracles—at least here in an increasingly scientifically-minded West—has become muffled, if not muted. “From our contemporary perspective we are inclined to view many such beliefs, including the belief in miracles, as inimical to the scientific outlook.”[2] These days many if not most scientifically educated observers, including not a few professing Christians, maintain that belief in miracles simply cannot be justified.
Largely inspired by Hume, objections to the veracity of miracle claims typically run something like this: even if we concede that miracles are logically possible, an event falling outside the bounds of the laws of nature (i.e., a miracle) is so outlandishly improbable, and human testimony supporting it so unreliable, that no amount of testimonial evidence is ever sufficient to justify a miracle claim. Given our knowledge of the laws of nature—fixed, observable regularities of the physical world—along with our understanding of probability and our familiarity with the vagaries of human nature, the only rational response to miracle claims is skepticism.
Against that line of reasoning I will argue first that in light of the problem of induction and the incompleteness of our knowledge of nature’s perceived regularities, there are no grounds for holding those perceived regularities to be laws that are universally binding. For that reason, I will argue further, miracles are best understood as “signs” of divine activity that defy the expectations borne of human experience rather than events that run against, around or beyond the laws of nature (whatever those are supposed to be). Finally I will briefly describe three categories of miracles which do not invoke the testimony of witnesses and in which belief appears justified: (1) miracles of cosmology; (2) miracles of prophecy; and (3) miracles of experience.
Miracles and Laws of Nature
So what is a miracle? Though there are likely dozens of distinct definitions available, I would place them in two basic categories: (1) miracles as violations (contraventions, interruptions, breaches, suspensions, etc.) of the laws of nature; and (2) miracles as “signs and wonders” that demonstrate the power of God to alter the course of human affairs. The first definition, more commonly accepted among today’s science-minded intellectuals, has it that the laws of nature are physical regularities so often and consistently confirmed that they should be considered absolute, exceptionless laws. Such a definition is problematic, if not incoherent. As Harrison notes, “[I]f there are miracles, this tends to destroy the very concept of a law of nature.”[3]
Some philosophers of a naturalist persuasion go further to suggest that miracles should be defined so that a miracle not only contravenes our current scientific understanding of how nature operates but also precludes any conceivably rational naturalistic explanation for the evidence at hand: “Hence,” says Keith Parsons, “a miracle must be partially defined as an event that is in principle incapable of receiving a naturalistic explanation.”[4] Convenient as such a burden of proof might be for naturalist philosophers, it’s strictly impossible to meet because there is no conceivable form of evidence that could not be interpreted in naturalistic terms.
Let’s take the paradigm example of the healing of an amputee. Imagine the following: An evangelist at a tent crusade prays for an amputee who is then healed on the spot. That is, a fully functional arm complete with fingers, muscles, nerves and all the rest emerges instantaneously from what just a moment before was a stump. In the audience is a well-known but skeptical psychologist, there to study the effects of religious faith on human perceptions of reality. Later asked about what he saw, the psychologist says it was odd, but not a miracle—probably just an elaborate magic trick. He would be convinced it was a miracle, he says, only if it were repeated under carefully controlled and monitored conditions and the event recorded. Arrangements are then made for the evangelist to pray for another amputee under the required conditions and with the psychologist present. Again the amputee is healed.
Fascinated and even bewildered, but still skeptical of miracles and suspecting a conspiracy of some kind, the psychologist then requests another experiment, but this time he gets to pick the venue, the monitoring authorities, and the equipment used to record the event. Another amputee is found willing to participate, the evangelist again prays for him, and yet again the amputee is healed. This time the psychologist, flush with excitement, rushes off to draft a new paper and announce a breathtaking discovery: given the right psychological state and socio-religious environment, humans can naturally regenerate their own limbs, similar to the way that garden-variety lizards regenerate their tails. Even more impressed with the creative-adaptive power of natural selection than before (and no less skeptical of miracles), he encourages further scientific research.
The moral of the story? If a putative miracle cannot be replicated, skeptics need not trust human testimony affirming it, nor even their own senses; but if it can be replicated, they may safely regard it a natural occurrence rather than a miracle. Of course, it’s true of all events that either they can be replicated or they cannot. This sort of “heads I win, tails you lose” approach to the question of miracles was first popularized by the great eighteenth century philosopher David Hume. Much like modern skeptics, Hume framed miracles in terms of their incompatibility with the laws of nature, and thus their improbability, yet he carefully avoided the potential veracity of extraordinary experience (what statisticians sometimes call the “problem of the single case”). “A miracle,” said Hume, “is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be.”[5]
Not surprisingly, Hume’s argument has been subjected to extensive scrutiny. According to John Loftus, there are four main objections to Hume’s argument: (1) Hume’s argument is circular; (2) Hume’s definition of a miracle makes miracles impossible; (3) Hume’s argument would force us to reject all miracles a priori, prior to examining the evidence; and (4) Hume fails to understand Bayes’ Theorem.[6] An atheist and skeptic of miracles himself, Loftus maintains that these objections all fail. I would disagree with him, particularly on (1) and (3).
For example, Hume says “it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country.” Then he says, “There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.”[7] We know the experience against miracles is uniform, that is, because miracles have never been observed, and we know miracles have never been observed because the experience against them is uniform. That certainly sounds like circular reasoning. And by essentially defining miracles as events that run counter to uniform experience and (therefore) have never been observed, Hume does seem to dismiss all testimony of miracles on a priori grounds.
Most scholars would agree, however, that Hume is not easy to interpret. “Hume’s argument against believing the testimony of miracles,” says Rockwood, “is far and away the most influential treatment of the topic. Yet, for all the attention it receives, there is not yet a consensus on how to interpret Hume’s argument.”[8] So it’s not clear whether Hume really does reject all miracle claims out of hand. One plausible interpretation has it that Hume’s argument is basically an instance of modus ponens: there is first an argument for the conditional statement that if the evidence for a miracle never actually outweighs the evidence for the laws of nature holding true, then the miracle claim should be rejected—followed by an argument for the truth of the antecedent.[9] On that view, since he holds out the bare possibility of evidence sufficient to justify a miracle claim, Hume does not explicitly argue in circles or reject miracle claims a priori.
In any case, because the ground covering interpretations of Hume on the above points is already so well-trod I will take a (somewhat) less traveled route, or at least one left unmentioned by Loftus. Instead I will propose that due to the notorious problem of induction, neither Hume nor anyone else can say exactly what the laws of nature are. More to the point, no one can explain exactly why certain perceived patterns of regularity in the physical world should be considered laws at all, and not simply descriptive generalizations borne of human experience. And given that there is no method available to verify the exceptionless regularity of the laws of nature, there is nothing to prevent rational acceptance of miracle claims on the testimony of evidently reliable witnesses.
The Failure of Inductivism
Most atheists and skeptics follow a line similar to Hume. The basic idea is to call attention to our knowledge of the “firm and unalterable” laws of nature and then play that against the testimony of often biased, gullible, or dishonest humans who claim to have witnessed a miracle in violation of those laws. Now it’s true that what we have come to regard as laws of nature are understood as firm and unalterable, and for good reason. Without accepting these highly distilled, mathematically precise theoretical abstractions as uniform, science cannot make much sense of the world, let alone make any further progress. But of course our scientific knowledge of the laws of nature, like our knowledge of most anything else, is ultimately derived from human experience.
The larger question, then, is whether human experience is itself “firm and unalterable”—that is, before scientists design controlled experiments, isolate variables, select data for analysis, disregard statistical outliers, file away unwelcome findings[10], interpret results (with a built-in confirmation bias[11], and otherwise squeeze out every last one of the very sorts of considerations that might lead us to question the firmness and inalterability of natural laws in the first place. On the face of it the answer to that question would be no, as the wide range of not only conflicting human testimony but even presently conflicting scientific theories attests.[12]
Underlying my own skepticism of natural laws is an understanding that any appeal to past experience to justify belief in a law of nature runs up against the problem of induction. The classic example of the problem is the black swan. For centuries the inductive inference that all swans are white seemed perfectly justified for European observers—at least until 1697, when the Dutch explorer de Vlamingh discovered black swans in Australia. As Dinesh D’Souza remarks, “What was previously considered a scientifically inviolable law had to be retired.”[13] Ironically, it was none other than David Hume who explained why there is no straightforwardly logical way to justify an inductive inference. Consider Hume’s remarks in the Enquiry alluding to Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation:
The mind can’t possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, however carefully we examine it, for the effect is totally different from the cause and therefore can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard ball is a distinct event from motion in the first, and nothing in the first ball’s motion even hints at motion in the second. A stone raised into the air and left without any support immediately falls; but if we consider this situation a priori we shall find nothing that generates the idea of a downward rather than upward or some other motion in the stone.[14]
“That’s why,” Hume concludes a bit later, “no reasonable scientist has ever claimed to know the ultimate cause of any natural process”—yet without knowing the ultimate causes of natural processes, there remains little justification for believing perceived regularities in the physical world to be “inviolable laws.”[15] (He could have added that this is why scientific theories are always falsifiable in principle—and indeed, as the history of science makes clear, often falsified.[16]) Belief in cause and effect, i.e., functional laws of nature, as it happens is not derived from reason but from perceptual habit. D’Souza thus maintains that whereas Hume does not deny that there may be certain laws of nature operating in the universe, he does deny “that we know what those laws are.”[17]
For skeptics like David Kyle Johnson, it’s not actually important to know what those laws are, only that they govern “the way the universe works”: “Whether you think that such laws exist as abstract objects, are true counterfactual propositions, or simply regularities that perpetuate throughout the universe, these laws of nature have been in effect since the beginning of the universe, and our ignorance of them does not cause them to cease to exist.”[18] The problem of induction, however, is not the lack of an agreed-upon metaphysical definition for the laws of nature, but of any rational basis for believing those laws (no matter how defined) to operate uniformly, always and everywhere. Ironically, Johnson can maintain that “justified belief in miracles is impossible” only if he can first justify belief in induction—which appears itself impossible.
The problem is that inductive reasoning is circular. To justify induction requires a belief that the laws of nature operate uniformly; but at the same time to justify a belief that the laws of nature operate uniformly requires induction. Samir Okasha thus observes “that our inductive inferences rest on the UN [uniformity of nature] assumption. But we cannot prove UN is true, and we cannot produce empirical evidence for its truth without begging the question.”[19] This might come as a shock to those trained in science rather than philosophy. Nonetheless, as Okasha notes further, “most people agree that it is very hard to see how there could be a satisfactory justification of induction.”[20]
From all indications Hume was right about induction; and because he was right about induction, he was wrong about miracles. After all, Hume’s argument against miracles is nothing if not an inductive argument. Whatever miracles may be, then, they are not contraventions of “inviolable laws of nature,” because—as Hume demonstrated to the satisfaction of almost all philosophers—we have no reason for believing laws of nature to be inviolable in the first place. The consequent lack of a rational foundation for believing the laws of nature to be universally binding, i.e., prescriptive rather than descriptive, again leaves us with scant justification for maintaining that miracle claims should be considered universally unworthy of belief.
For objectivity’s sake I should mention that this all comes with a caveat. While the problem of induction is an important part of my argument, the practical implications of that problem should not be overstated. Even if technically impossible to justify, a working confidence in induction appears eminently sensible, arising as it does from a universal human intuition, and even necessary in order to function in the world (let alone practice science). Implicit trust in induction is much like a properly basic belief in that respect. My point is simply that induction is not strictly rational, and therefore provides no reason to think there are not and have never been exceptions to even the most well-established inductively derived generalizations—miracles, in other words.
Signs, Wonders, and Miracles
But if not a violation of the laws of nature, what exactly is a miracle? Scripture commonly denotes miracles as “signs and wonders.” The signs given by Moses to Pharaoh in Exodus, for example, and the seven signs of Jesus’ divinity in John’s Gospel, are miracles in that they point to God’s power and faithfulness to bless, deliver, heal and restore his people. These are marvelous indicators of God’s activity, usually in the context of a human need or crisis. By this definition a miracle is humanly and spiritually/religiously significant, and not simply an antecedently improbable occurrence.
Consider the catastrophe of September 11, 2001. The day before 9-11, the probability of the destruction of the World Trade Center by foreign terrorists using domestic airliners as missiles must have been close to zero for anyone other than the terrorists themselves. Nassim Taleb remarks that given our nation’s military readiness at the time, “had the risk been reasonably conceivable on September 10, it would not have happened.”[21] Thus it was an extremely low-probability event (and thus extremely low-probability events sometimes occur). But there is no reason to think it was a miracle per se. Now suppose that Billy Graham or some other religious leader had prophesied on New Year’s Day of 2001 that unless America turned from its crass materialism back to God, its mightiest symbols of wealth would be destroyed within a year’s time as a sign of the Lord’s displeasure. In that case the 9-11 events would seem to have miraculous implications.
According to Denis Alexander, what marks out a miracle is the “historical-religious context” in which it occurs—”an understanding in stark contrast to Hume’s concept of miracles as isolated anomalies which violate the laws of nature.”[22] Some of the best examples of signs and wonders, given their conspicuously religious context, would be the many accounts of miracles preserved in the biblical documents. Beyond the original miracle—the creation of the universe and life within it—signs and wonders in the Old Testament would include such marvels as the revelation of God through a burning bush (“this great sight,” as Moses called it); the plagues on Egypt, followed by the Exodus; the collapse of the walls of Jericho; fire consuming Elijah’s offering on Mount Carmel; the healing of the waters of Jericho; and numerous prophecies, now evidently fulfilled, concerning the coming of Messiah and the restoration of the Jewish people to their ancient homeland.
New Testament miracles include the virgin birth of Christ; Jesus calming the storm at the Sea of Galilee; Jesus (and Peter, briefly) walking on water; numerous healings and exorcisms at the hands of Jesus; the raising of Lazarus; the feeding of the five thousand (and the four thousand); Peter’s great catch of fish; the resurrection of Jesus; and various miracles included among the Acts of the apostles. Beyond the biblical writings are accounts of widely attested miracles of healing and exorcism in the subsequent history of the church, as reported by Justin Martyr, Origen, Tertullian, and Irenaeus. Kelhoffer observes that Justin in particular took pains to document a number of contemporary miracles, especially exorcisms, to which he appealed as evidence of divine power to the Roman Prefect Urbicus, who had apparently witnessed the same: “Thus the performing of exorcisms is regarded as a regular activity of certain believers in Rome.”[23]
That miracles would continue after the advent of the apostles should not be surprising to Christian believers. “These signs,” said Jesus to his disciples, “will follow those who believe”—referring to casting out demons, speaking in tongues, healing the sick, and odd phenomena like handling deadly snakes or drinking poison without suffering harm (Mark 16:17-18). Elsewhere Jesus said of those who believe in him, “the works that I do, he will do also” (John 14:12). So it is that miracle testimony remains commonplace even in today’s scientifically enlightened society. According to Craig Keener, eyewitness reports of miracles number in the many millions:
A 2006 Pew Forum survey of just ten countries on four continents suggests that about two hundred million Pentecostal and Protestant charismatics in those countries alone claim to have witnessed divine healing. Perhaps more surprisingly, some 39 percent of Christians in those countries who are not Pentecostals or Protestant charismatics also claim to have witnessed divine healing.[24]
Many miracle claimants are highly credible witnesses, a substantial number of them medical doctors—people with considerable scientific knowledge who are specially trained to find natural causes for physical anomalies and abnormalities. “Indeed,” adds Keener, “another survey suggests that nearly three-quarters of doctors in the United States believe in miracles. More importantly, over half … noted that they witnessed what they considered to be miracles.”[25] The fact that so many highly educated observers have reported witnessing miracles immediately puts the lie to Hume’s supporting premise that belief in miracles is the product of ignorant and superstitious minds.
Readers may recall that Hume analyzed the question of miracles as a matter of competing probabilities, where “more miraculous” means less probable: “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish.”[26] Because the laws of nature are firm and unalterable, says Hume, the probability that the people claiming a miracle are lying or deceived will always be greater than the probability that a miracle actually occurred.[27] But in light of the sheer number of credible miracle accounts documented to date, along with the problem of induction and a long history of failed scientific theories, the argument should be stood on its head. It appears far more likely, that is, that of the millions of miracle accounts given by credible witnesses, at least a few of them are true, than that the so-called laws of nature—as the latest scientific formulations have led us to understand them, that is—have not once failed to hold.
This ambiguity of probability could well be by God’s design, in that answering the question of miracles would have to be somewhat subjective, and therefore somewhat a matter of faith. Belief in miracles would be justified, then, to the extent that the miracle appears—at least to a particular observer given his background knowledge and prior beliefs—to be the best explanation for the facts in evidence. In the following sections we will examine three categories of what I would consider miracles in which belief is justified, where “justified” means something like “reasonable to accept given the relevant evidence and the alternative explanations available.” Moreover, they make no appeal to the miracle testimony of witnesses whom skeptics distrust. The first has to do with cosmology, specifically the origin of the universe and of life within it.
Miracles of Cosmology
Despite all that’s been said about inductive inferences, some skeptics and critics may want to bite the bullet and assert that the physical regularities of nature are so firmly established that they should be considered absolute laws—in which case a miracle would indeed be a contravention of otherwise “inviolable laws of nature.” Even in that case, though, I think a good argument for at least a couple of bona fide miracles could still be made, the first of which might run as follows:
- The first law of thermodynamics states that energy cannot be created.
- The first law of thermodynamics is a law of nature.
- If the universe originated from nothing, the energy in the universe was created. (given)
- The universe originated from nothing.[28]
- The energy in the universe was created. (from 3 & 4)
- 6. The origin of the universe contravened the first law of thermodynamics. (from 1 & 5)
- A miracle is an event that contravenes a law of nature. (definition)
- The origin of the universe was a miracle (from 2, 6, & 7).
Granted, it may be possible to evade the miraculous implications of a big bang cosmology (assuming the big bang is an accurate cosmological model). Mark Vuletic for example points out that on general relativity the origin of the universe means the origin not only of space but of time: “That means that on this view there can be no such thing as a time t < 0. But if there is no time t < 0 when there was no energy, then the presence of any amount of energy at t = 0 cannot violate the first law of thermodynamics.”[29] In other words, while the first law forbids the creation of energy within an existing (closed) system, there’s no law saying that a closed system chock full of energy cannot itself be created—or at least “come into being.” Thus it seems that even if the universe is a closed system, a possibility remains for a thermodynamically non-miraculous origin of the universe. There’s a more straightforwardly logical way to look at it, though, which involves no special pleading. Even if time and energy were created together, it still follows that energy was created. The first law says energy cannot be created. Therefore the origin of the universe violated the first law.
Following Stephen Hawking and others, Vuletic appeals alternatively to the “zero-energy universe hypothesis,” that the negative energy of gravitation exactly equals the energy put into the universe at the big bang, so that they cancel out one another and there is no net increase of energy. This bit of speculation seems to me another instance of special pleading rather than a straightforwardly rational explanation. We don’t actually know that negative and positive energies in the universe precisely cancel one another; we only know that they must if we are to avoid a miracle according to the laws of thermodynamics. Besides being largely speculative, problems with the theory include an inability in principle to measure total energy in a universe composed largely of dark matter/energy; and the difficulty of calculating negative gravitational energy.[30]
In short, a non-miraculous origin of the universe seems highly improbable, but at the same time not entirely impossible—which makes it ironically much like a miracle in that respect. But even if they were somehow scientifically plausible in principle such objections would still come at a price. For if the natural order is really all there is, as naturalism entails, and yet had a beginning, as general relativity entails, it must have all emerged from nothing whatsoever.[31] At the same time if the natural universe itself emerged from nothing whatsoever, this would arguably constitute a miracle far greater than a temporary violation of the laws of physics, in that it would have no cause and no explanation—scientific or otherwise—not even in principle.[32] Here we would do well to recall Hume’s rational dictum which requires us to “reject the greater miracle.”
A similar argument could be made for the miraculous origin of life, through an appeal to the “law of biogenesis” (or theory of biogenesis as Louis Pasteur called it). The law of biogenesis states “that life can only come from other life.”[33] This is a law as well-established as any, in that while we have many billions of recorded instances of reproduction, there have been no recorded instances of abiogenesis, i.e., living organisms arising by means other than by reproduction of other, already existing organisms. Rudolph Virchow stated the same principle: Omnis cellula e cellula (“every cell from a cell”); and as F. M. Harold puts it, “Virchow’s law has stood the test of more than 3 billion years…”[34] Thus the argument:
- The law of biogenesis states that living organisms are generated only by the reproduction of other living organisms.
- The law of biogenesis is a law of nature.
- If the first living organism was not generated by the reproduction of other living organisms, its generation contravened the law of biogenesis. (from 1 & 2)
- The first living organism was not generated by the reproduction of other living organisms. (given)
- The origin of life contravened the law of biogenesis. (from 1 & 4)
- A miracle is an event that contravenes a law of nature. (definition)
- The origin of life on earth was a miracle. (from 2, 5, & 6)
This argument appears somewhat stronger than the previous argument. Almost everyone agrees, after all, that life originated on earth (or elsewhere within our universe) at some point in the past, whereas a few serious observers believe the universe to have always existed in one form or another. Some skeptics would contend further that if belief in a universe whose origin is uncaused or inexplicable is irrational, then so is belief in God. (On that point I would suggest that a self-existent God who transcends the physical universe is prima facie more plausible than a self-existent universe which somehow transcends its own physical properties, particularly entropy.) The argument from biogenesis, by contrast, doesn’t face the kinds of deep metaphysical questions and paradoxes often associated with the origin of the universe.
All told, though, neither the origin of the universe nor of life within it can be easily squared with our understanding of certain so-called laws of physics and biology. Hence both appear strong candidates for meeting Hume’s definition of a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature. Importantly, they also provide empirical “precedent” for miracles, thereby considerably increasing their prior probability in Bayesian analyses of historically attested miracles like the resurrection of Jesus.
Miracles of Prophecy
Because even the most intelligent of humans cannot predict the futures of nations or of individuals, specific prophecies uttered in the name of the Lord and later fulfilled constitute evidence of the foreknowledge of God. Hume himself observed that “all prophecies are real miracles”[35], and for that reason alone was skeptical of them. Scripture is loaded with prophetic declarations—precisely 1,817 of them according to Grant Jeffrey.[36] One of the more impressive examples is the destruction of the Phoenician coastal city of Tyre in “waves,” as prophesied by Ezekiel and fulfilled in a succession of assaults by Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, Alexander the Great, as well as Egyptians and Romans.[37] Also noteworthy are a whole host of prophecies, from the Psalms, Isaiah, Zechariah and other books, foretelling the ministry, crucifixion and resurrection of the Messiah, all fulfilled in Jesus Christ.[38] Space forbids discussion of these in an article like this one.
Instead I will briefly examine the physical restoration of the nation of Israel, as prophesied in various biblical books, notably Ezekiel, and fulfilled in the twentieth century. I chose this example because the fulfillment clearly occurred well after the prophecies given; and I will focus particularly on Ezekiel, since his predictions were more detailed and specific. In Ezekiel 36, the prophet declares that after he “scattered them among the nations” (v. 19), God would restore the people of Israel: “For I will take you among the nations, gather you out of all countries, and bring you into your own land” (v. 24).”
Sure enough, in 1948 the prophecy was decidedly fulfilled against great odds and opposition. Following their violent expulsion from Jerusalem in 70 A.D., roughly 1,800 years of wandering and persecution, the expansion of Nazism and fascism, and just three years on the heels of a Holocaust that threatened to destroy them completely, the Jewish people established their own state and returned en masse to their ancient Palestinian homeland. (Jeffrey goes to some lengths to argue that Ezekiel actually prophesied the exact day of Israel’s restoration, in Ezek. 4:3-6.39″[39])
But the prophecy adds that God would so bless the land that it would become practically unrecognizable. “I will call for the grain and multiply it, and bring no famine upon you. And I will multiply the fruit of your trees and the increase of your fields…” (vv. 29-30). Since 1948, Israel’s GDP has continually increased, often booming, and the state has become highly educated and modernized. Her Jewish population has grown steadily even while the democratic government has encouraged widely diverse non-Jewish citizenry (including Arabs). And in a notably specific fulfillment, where there was once desert, thousands of acres have been irrigated and millions of bountiful fruit trees planted.
Also since the day of its founding, the modern state of Israel has unfortunately had to fight desperate wars, surrounded, outnumbered and outgunned by a host of nations openly committed to wiping her “off the map”—yet over the course of those conflicts has become a regional military power and has often gained territory. As a result of the Six-Day War of 1967 in particular, Israel took command of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula (from Syria, Jordan, and Egypt respectively).[40]
Now I realize that the modern history of Israel is a source of controversy for many. Regardless of one’s political views on Zionism or the fate of the Palestinians, however, modern Israel stands as a testament to the astonishing accuracy of biblical prophecy. Of course, skeptics may consider this, along with untold dozens of other fulfilled predictions, just a big coincidence. But at some point an objective view of prophecy requires that we acknowledge the wisdom of Yogi Berra: “That’s just too coincidental to be a coincidence.”
Miracles of Experience
At this point I will turn to my own experiences of the miraculous. Most of my life as a Christian believer has been routine, unremarkable, often difficult and sometimes even desperately painful. But I have also experienced a handful of miracles and I remember them distinctly. Beyond my initial conversion forty years ago from a life of habitual selfishness, foolishness and drunkenness to a life of seeking God and his kingdom—arguably a miracle in its own right—two experiences stand out in particular. The first was a healing that I experienced back in 1987 while a university student recently converted to the faith. I will quote from the draft of a book I have currently in the works, The Shadow of Leviathan:
I had just returned to my apartment after finishing my midterm exams for the Spring semester, following two or three days of virtually non-stop, around-the-clock cramming. I had consumed so much coffee that I could see little flashes of light streak across the screen of my mind like tracer bullets whenever I closed my eyes. And while my head had been mildly throbbing for the previous day or so it began to pound incessantly; yet pain relievers seemed to have no effect. As a result of all this I couldn’t manage to sleep despite total exhaustion. Increasingly desperate but having no doctor, health insurance or money, I knelt over on my bed and quietly prayed for God to heal me…. What followed a minute or two later was the most powerful miracle I have experienced in all my years as a believer…. I was visited by the presence of God and supernaturally healed. All my pain and distress was somehow swept away in a few moments with a sound much like a rushing wind.
On another occasion in 1993, my lovely wife Tricia and I were travelling during cloudy and freezing weather from Lubbock, Texas to a Bible conference in Amarillo, when I lost control of my little Nissan pickup truck. We had slipped sideways for a second or two along a stretch of ice on the highway when my tires caught a patch of dry ground near the shoulder and the truck flipped onto its side, rolling over completely down a snow-covered embankment and then coming to rest upside-down in the snow dozens of feet from the road. While I was able to crawl out the window of my truck unharmed, Tricia cried out that she couldn’t move; she was pinned between the dashboard and the roof of the cab. There was no one nearby to help and the only other vehicles I could see were off in the distance, either stuck themselves or creeping slowly in the opposite direction; and I had no phone to call anyone (this was before everyone carried cell phones). Dazed and despairing over what to do, I began to pace back and forth in the snow muttering prayers for God to help us.
Within a few moments a voice behind me interrupted my pacing and prayer. I turned and saw a man with dark hair wearing a black Harley-Davidson T-shirt over what looked like long underwear. He stood in the snow in front of me and said something like, “Listen, I’ve already called 9-11 and they’re on the way.” I distinctly remember that he then said, “You believe in God, right?”—to which I nodded yes—and then, “Well, he’s going to help you.” Then he pointed over to my truck and said, “But right now your wife needs you to go over there and be strong for her.” I said, “You’re right,” and turned toward the truck; but when I turned back around to thank him, he was gone.
To this day I have no idea who that man was, where he came from or where he went. I did what he said, though, and went over to encourage and console my wife. Some minutes later an EMS truck arrived. Using “Jaws of Life” hydraulic rescue tools, the crew carefully extracted Tricia from the truck and discovered she had sustained a fracture to her pelvis. Though at the time she was four months pregnant and the paramedics feared the worst, she gave birth to a handsome, healthy baby boy five months later. I said all that to suggest the possibility that the mysterious man who appeared out of nowhere to help me and then disappeared just as quickly was an angel sent by God. In Scripture, angels are not always brightly shining beings, but sometimes take on human appearance. The book of Hebrews instructs believers to be hospitable to strangers, “for by so doing have “unwittingly entertained angels” (Heb. 13:2).
I still remember these events vividly. I have no doubt they actually happened. If someone were to strap me to a lie detector and ask me if the above accounts were true, I would say yes without hesitation and (assuming the machine worked the way it should) I would certainly pass the test. So what to make of my testimony? One viable possibility is that despite my assurances to the contrary, I am simply lying and have made up both stories. But I am a sincere believer with no reason to fabricate such stories; indeed, I am prohibited from lying by the very God in whom I profess my faith. It seems to me that something is wrong with a skeptical philosophy that requires countless numbers of apparently honest people to be shameless liars instead.
Another possibility is that in each case what I experienced was something naturally explicable, even if unusual, and over time my memory of the event, aided by a religious mindset willing to believe in miracles, gradually became more embellished with miraculous elements over time. The problem there is that my experiences of the events in question were so powerful that the memories of them have been with me and reflected upon often since the day they occurred, so that there has been no lapse of time in which they could have become substantially distorted. Finally, it could be that in each case I was simply deceived by an elaborate trick of the senses. But that argument cuts both ways: if my senses can deceive me, other people’s senses might well fail to convince them of the truth—in which case it may be that skeptics have witnessed any number of bona fide miracles themselves but been deceived into believing they were just seeing things.
Now it’s true that there can be no external evidence (other than my testimony) for my personal experiences, because by definition my personal experiences cannot be examined by others. Critics might regard this as groundless subjectivism, or maybe epistemological egoism. But personal experience—that is, direct experience—is really one of the most powerful forms of epistemic justification, whether others assent to my belief or not. Plantinga offers a scenario in which he has been accused of a crime, and considerable evidence suggests he did it, but he doesn’t remember committing it, nor being anywhere near the scene, and instead remembers going hiking the day on which it occurred. Therefore, even though his belief is disputed by others and he cannot explain the evidence presented against him, he is justified in holding that belief: “Because I remember where I was, and that puts me within my rights in believing that I was off hiking, even if others disagree with me.[41] In other words, a properly basic belief carries more epistemic weight than an inductive inference. Admittedly, though, an argument for miracles from experience cannot work for those who have not experienced such miracles themselves, and who further dispute the testimony of believers (which would include me along with the apostles of Jesus and countless millions of others). For those who distrust not only the testimony of believers but the miraculous implications of the evidence of cosmology and of prophecy, I suspect little can be done—short of a miracle—to convince them otherwise. But precisely because I believe God still works miracles, I hold out hope that even my most skeptical friends will one day put their trust in him.
Notes
[1] Peter Harrison, “Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 56, No. 4 (October 1995): 531-553, p. 531.
[2] Harrison, “Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature,” p. 552.
[3] Harrison, “Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature,” p. 532.
[4] Keith Parsons, “Miracles, Confirmation, and Apologetics” [chapter 4] in “Science, Confirmation, and the Theistic Hypothesis” (PhD Dissertation, Queen’s University at Kingston, 1986).
[5] David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (New York, NY: Oxford, 2007), p. 83 [in “Of Miracles”].
[6] John W. Loftus, “Questioning Miracles: In Defense of David Hume” (April 6, 2024). The Secular Web. <https://infidels.org/library/modern/questioning-miracles/>.
[7] Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 83.
[8] Nathan Rockwood, “Two (Failed) Versions of Hume’s Argument Against Miracles.” Faith & Philosophy Vol. 39, No. 4 (October 2022): 573-592, p. 573.
[9] Rockwood, “Two (Failed) Versions of Hume’s Argument Against Miracles,” p. 577.
[10] This is a recurring problem in scientific research. See Donald Kennedy, “The Old File-Drawer Problem.” Science, July 23, 2004.
[11] For research into the problem of confirmation bias in science, see Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises.” Review of General Psychology, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1998): 175-220.
[12] It’s worth noting here that two of the best-established scientific theories of our time—general relativity and quantum mechanics—are known to be fundamentally at odds with one another. For a recent overview of the problem, see Joseph Aziz & Richard Howl, “Classical Theories of Gravity Produce Entanglement.” Nature Vol. 646 (October 22, 2025): 813-817.
[13] Dinesh D’Souza, What’s So Great About Christianity (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2007), p. 184.
[14] Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 21.
[15] Note on language: many scientists nowadays tend to shy away from talk of “cause and effect” when describing laws of nature, preferring the idea that one state is a function of a prior state.
[16] For a list of failed scientific theories and why they so often fail, see: Larry Laudan, “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” Philosophy of Science Vol. 48, No. 1 (March 1981): 19-49.
[17] D’Souza, What’s So Great About Christianity, p. 186.
[18] David Kyle Johnson, “Why Justified Belief in Miracles is Impossible.” Science, Religion & Culture Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 2015): 61-74, p. 65.
[19] Samir Okasha, Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (New York, NY: 2002), p. 27.
[20] Okasha, Philosophy of Science, p. 28.
[21] Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,” New York Times, April 22, 2007.
[22] Denis. R. Alexander, “Miracles and Science” (2017). Faraday Institute for Science and Religion, p. 3. <https://www.faraday.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/resources/Faraday%20Papers/Faraday%20Paper%2020%20Alexander_En.pdf>.
[23] James A. Kelhoffer, “The Apostle Paul and Justin Martyr on the Miraculous.” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies Vol. 42, No. 2 (2001): 163-184, p. 181.
[24] Craig S. Keener, Miracles Today: The Supernatural Work of God in the Modern World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2021), p. 25.
[25] Keener, Miracles Today, p. 26.
[26] Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 83.
[27] The standard procedure for some skeptical philosophers is to set the problem in the context of Bayes’ theorem, where the prior probability of the laws of nature is presumed to be extremely high, and therefore the prior probability of a miracle extremely low; and then see if the evidence can somehow boost the probability for a miracle high enough to confirm it despite the odds. Even then good arguments can be made for miracles from a Bayesian perspective. See, for example: John Depoe, “Vindicating a Bayesian Approach to Confirming Miracles.” Philosophia Christi Vol. 10, No. 1 (2008): 229-238.
[28] It turns out that “nothing” means different things to different people. For physicists like Lawrence Krauss, it means something like an unstable “quantum vacuum” that produces random energy fluctuations, one of which birthed our universe. In that case the origin of the quantum vacuum would violate the laws of thermodynamics.
[29] Mark Vuletic, “Did the Big Bang Violate the First Law of Thermodynamics?” (February 2, 2018). Ninewells. <https://ninewells.vuletic.com/science/defenders-guide-to-science-and-creationism/big-bang-first-law-of-thermodynamics/>.
[30] Giedrius Pakalka & Alius Noreika, “What is [the] Zero-Energy Universe Hypothesis?” Technology Org. <https://www.technology.org/how-and-why/zero-energy-universe-hypothesis/>.
[31] Given that the natural order had a beginning, it could not have come from an existing singularity, or from vacuum energy, or quantum foam, or a multiverse, or anything else, because on naturalism these would all have to be parts of the natural order itself.
[32] On a big bang cosmology, the original singularity is a point at which, according to physicists like Stephen Hawking, “the laws of science break down” (laws of thermodynamics included). And clearly if the laws of science can break down, miracles can happen.
[33] Allen L. Gerwin & Frank Sherwin, “Louis Pasteur’s Views on Creation, Evolution, and the Genesis of Germs.” Answers Research Journal Vol. 1 (2008): 43-52, p. 46.
[34] Franklin M. Harold, The Way of the Cell: Molecules, Organisms, and the Order of Life (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 99.
[35] Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 95.
[36] Grant R. Jeffrey, The Signature of God: Astonishing Biblical Discoveries (Toronto, Canada: Frontier Research Publications, 1996).
[37] See Hank Hanegraaff, “Has Ezekiel’s Prophecy Against Tyre Really Been Fulfilled?” (October 9, 2015). Christian Research Institute. <https://www.equip.org/articles/has-ezekiels-prophecy-against-tyre-really-been-fulfilled/>.
[38] See Douglas D. Scott, “Is Jesus of Nazareth the Predicted Messiah? A Historical-Evidential Approach to Specific Old Testament Prophecies and their New Testament Fulfillments” (PhD Dissertation, Liberty University, 2017).
[39] Readers are encouraged to examine the full argument in Jeffrey, The Signature of God: Astonishing Biblical Discoveries, pp. 165-170.
[40] Information on the economic and military development of modern Israel has largely been taken from H. J. de Blij & Peter O. Muller, Geography: Realms, Regions & Concepts, 10th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), pp. 311-317.
[41] Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 2000), pp. 450-451.
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