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Jason Thibodeau

Position: Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Cypress College, Cypress, California.

Education:

  • Ph.D., Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 2006
  • M.A., Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 2002
  • B.A., Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, 1997

Teaching Positions:

  1. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Georgia Perimeter College, Fall 2010 - Present
  2. Instructor, Imperial Valley College, Spring - Winter 2008
  3. Adjunct Instructor, Cuyamaca College, Spring 2008 - Fall 2009
  4. Visiting Assistant Professor, Auburn University, Department of Philosophy Fall 2005 - Fall 2006
  5. Teaching Assistant, University of California, San Diego, Fall 1998 - Spring 2005

Presentations:

  1. "The Problem of Evil and the Capacity to Cause Suffering." Northwest Philosophy Conference, October 2007.
  2. Commentary on Jason Jordan's "The Anthropoid Coffin: Divine Omnipotence and the Limes of Subjectivity." Northwest Philosophy Conference, October 2007.
  3. "Analyticity Re-re-examined." Auburn Philosophical Society Colloquium, December 2006.
  4. "The Standard Meter and Performative Utterances." Alabama Philosophical Society Conference, October 2005.
  5. "Natural Kind Terms and Natural Substance Terms." University of California, San Diego Graduate Philosophy Colloquium, February 2005.
  6. "Teaching an Old Dogma New Tricks." University of California, San Diego Graduate Philosophy Colloquium, April 2004.
  7. "Moore and Wittgenstein On Certainty and Skepticism." University of California, San Diego Graduate Philosophy Colloquium, February 2003.

Publications:

  1. "The Epistemic Status of Analytic Statements" (forthcoming)
  2. "The Virtues and Ultimate Impotence of the Free Will Defense" (forthcoming)

Homepage: http://notnotaphilosopher.wordpress.com/


Published on the Secular Web


Modern Library

Do Atheists Need a Moral Theory to be Moral Realists?

Despite the power and influence of the Euthyphro dilemma, many apologists maintain that theism alone has the resources to account for objective moral properties. These authors dispute the commonly held view that the argument of the Euthyphro demonstrates that morality must be independent of God (especially as this argument is applied to theories that ground morality in the character of God as opposed to His commands). They argue in addition that regardless of the outcome of that debate, a nontheistic worldview is not compatible with belief in objective morality. In this paper I demonstrate that the argument that there is no viable atheistic account of the ground of morality depends upon the mistaken assumption that theism itself has the kind of moral theory that atheism allegedly lacks.
Kiosk Article

How to Use the Argument From Evil

The problem of evil can be used in two different ways. It can be used offensively; that is, in an attempt to criticize and undermine theistic belief, to show that theism is false and that belief in God is unfounded--a very difficult task. But the problem of evil can also be used defensively, i.e., to show that atheism is epistemically warranted, justified, or reasonable. Such efforts can succeed even when the proffered arguments fail to convince theists that God does not exist.
Kiosk Video

Interview with Jason Thibodeau on the Euthyphro Dilemma

Join host Edouard Tahmizian in this nearly one hour interview with Jason Thibodeau, a philosophy professor at Cypress College who's on the board of directors of Internet Infidels, about Plato's famous Euthyphro dilemma to the classic divine command theory of ethics, in which morally right actions are identified with those actions that are commanded (or otherwise approved) by God. After briefly stating a simple version of the Euthyphro dilemma and explaining its history, Thibodeau discusses the difference between (deontic) moral rightness and (axiological) moral goodness, how Robert M. Adams defended a deontic, but not axiological, kind of divine command theory, how the arbitrariness objection to divine command theory arises, and the sophisticated (but unsuccessful) attempts by Edward Wierenga and William Lane Craig to forge a middle way between the two mutually exclusive options of the traditional Euthyphro dilemma (which boil down to whether or not God has reasons for his commands). The discussion then turns to the implausibility of libertarian free will, whether a person who has no knowledge of good and evil can, in that state of ignorance, commit sin, whether a being that is admittedly causally responsible for giving human beings an inclination to sin is in any way morally responsible for their sinful behavior, and whether a being (any being) simply telling someone not to do something can ever really make a forbidden action morally wrong. Check out this wide-ranging yet deep interview!

Euthyphro Dilemma: Why There is No Third Option

William Lane Craig has frequently claimed that the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma because there is a third option. In this video, I explain why Craig is wrong about this. I explain the dilemma, explain why it is a dilemma, and show that Craig's alleged third option is not an option at all.

The Euthyphro Dilemma: Matt Flannagan vs. Jason Thibodeau (Capturing Christianity)

The Euthyphro dilemma says that either God has reasons for his commands, or He doesn’t. Take the second option. God has no reasons for His commands. Well, then God’s commands are arbitrary; but morality can’t be arbitrary. Now take the first option. God has reasons for His commands. Well, then these reasons themselves are sufficient to give us moral obligations. No need for God. The Euthyphro dilemma is meant to show that grounding morality in God is misguided. Jason Thibodeau argues that the Euthyphro dilemma is sound, whereas Matt Flannagan argues that it is not.

Common Myths About Morality

In this presentation from the 2017 Cypress College World Philosophy Day event, Jason Thibodeau discusses four common myths about morality: that (1) morality depends on God; (2) morality is subjective; (3) morality is relative; and (4) morality does not fit into a material world.