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Clifford Greenblatt

Clifford Greenblatt

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David Chalmers' Principle of Organizational Invariance and the Personal Soul (2014)

David Chalmers argues that conscious experience is a real but nonphysical feature of nature. However, he also believes that all particular facts about any conscious experience supervene (naturally, but not logically) on physical facts, such that physical facts fully determine any conscious experience. His principle of organizational invariance goes even further to claim that fine-grained functional organization fully determines any conscious experience (naturally, but not logically). This principle has powerful implications for artificial intelligence, allowing for the possibility of fully conscious digital computers. But the principle of organizational invariance is not compatible with the concept of a personal soul. This paper does not attempt to prove or disprove the existence of a personal soul, but defends its conceptual coherence against the challenge presented by Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance.

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Clifford Greenblatt's Kiosk Articles

Clifford Greenblatt holds a BSEE degree from Case Western Reserve University and an MSEE degree from Johns Hopkins University. Since 1984, he has been employed in the design and development of meteorological instruments. Clifford Greenblatt trusts the biblical view of reality, however he is quite interested in the philosophy of naturalism.

Published on the Secular Web

Kiosk Article

Sentience Not Explained

Daniel C. Dennett has provided a valuable insight into the operation of the conscious mind in his book, Consciousness Explained. This work demolishes the fallacy of the Cartesian Theater and replaces it with a scientifically verifiable Multiple Drafts model. Dennett disqualifies the mystery of qualia but conspicuously neglects the much greater mystery of sentience. Most interestingly, he not only acknowledges sentience in his later book, Kinds of Minds, but also admits to both its great moral implications and lack of present explanation. This discussion is not intended as a book review but rather as a critique of Dennett's claim that anything fitting his Multiple Drafts model is conscious in the fullest sense.