(2026)
ABSTRACT: In this article Gregory Shushan responds to Keith Augustine’s characterization of his recent article “Diversity and Similarity of Near-Death Experiences across Cultures and History: Implications for the Survival Hypothesis.” Addressing Augustine’s misconceptions of his theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary positioning, Shushan clarifies that he is a secular historian of religions who examines NDEs through cultural, historical, and ritual lenses. He reiterates that far from advocating a survivalist interpretation of the phenomenon, his article shows how the historical and cross-cultural accounts present distinct analytical challenges to both materialist and survivalist hypotheses. Shushan reaffirms his commitment to interpretive neutrality, emphasizing that the historical study of NDEs remains entirely independent of their underlying ontological status.
I was surprised to find my recent article in the International Review of Psychiatry (IRP) (Shushan, 2024) discussed by Keith Augustine in a piece titled “Are Survivalists Unable to Answer Their Critics?” First, I am not a “survivalist.” I am a secular historian of religions with a background in Egyptology and archaeology. While I specialize in the study near-death experiences (NDEs), I do so from the perspective of their cultural, religious, and historical dimensions. I am interested in the varying ways in which people in past societies have responded to NDEs: how they have impacted afterlife beliefs; how they have been criticized as irrational or regarded as sorcerous; how they have intersected with afterlife-related religious literature and ritual; how they have been enlisted as political tools by missionaries and colonizing forces; and how they have been used by indigenous people in response to those who sought to dominate them (Shushan, 2018; 2025).
All of this is entirely irrespective of the ontological status of NDEs, and essentially irrelevant to it. On the rare occasions that I have discussed the survival debate, I have done so in the spirit of methodological and interpretative fairness—as varying cultural and disciplinary understandings of the phenomenon. Nowhere have I argued for the survival hypothesis, and indeed I always take care in my work to make my approach clear. My contribution to the IRP issue—written at the request of the editor—is no exception. Its purpose was to highlight some “implications for the survival hypothesis” (as the subtitle states) in light of my research on cross-cultural NDEs. It pointed out a number of challenges to both survivalist and materialist interpretations of the phenomenon. Augustine acknowledged this when he quoted and agreed with my comment that the universality of NDEs “specifies neither a metaphysical nor a neuroscientific conclusion” (I use the term “metaphysical” as it is commonly used in the study of religions: phenomena that indicate a transcendent reality beyond the physical world). He might also have quoted any number of similar qualifying statements I made:
- “cross-cultural NDE accounts have serious implications for any theory that attempts to make ontological sense of the phenomenon—and indeed can be used to support both sides of the debate”
- “NDEs remain unexplained phenomena”
- “the similarities could alternatively support a materialist hypothesis”
- “anecdotal historical accounts cannot be considered proof that any of these extraordinary events actually occurred”
- “some prophecies ostensibly received during NDEs have gone unfulfilled”
- “such accounts create problems for those who believe that NDEs are evidence of life after death”
…and so on. My stance, I thought, could not be clearer than my final paragraph:
While it is possible to accommodate the cross-cultural evidence to a philosophical model of the afterlife, this is very different from claiming that the cross-cultural data actively support such a hypothesis. Arguments that the reality of NDEs is demonstrated by associated prophetic or transformative phenomena are also problematic. Even if we grant that such phenomena are veridical, they do not necessarily point to an actual afterlife, technically proving only the possibility of precognition and transformation resulting from near-death states…. the ontological nature of NDEs and the possibility of survival after death remain matters of personal belief—as do materialist models of NDEs and disbelief in an afterlife.
It was therefore rather bizarre to read Augustine’s characterization of me as someone “determined to find a place for spirits somewhere in the natural world” and who fails “to see issues through any other lens.” And it was positively surreal to see myself included among scholars “only considering potential parapsychological evidence for survival” and ignoring evidence from “other empirical disciplines” that might challenge my supposedly survivalist beliefs. I have no idea how one could reach such a conclusion when (a) the vast majority of my primary sources are anthropological, historical, or religious—not parapsychological; (b) I take no side in the article or anywhere else; and (c) do indeed summarize arguments and evidence on both sides. Nearly everything Augustine accuses me of in his piece (by lumping me together with my supposed “survivalist brethren”) is irrelevant to me and my work.
Second, I have no idea what “critics” I have allegedly been “unable to answer,” or on what issues. My publication record shows that I have never been “unable to answer” any critics. To my knowledge, this is only the second time I have been criticized in print with the erroneous and mystifying charge of being “a survivalist,” and I responded to the earlier critic at length and in great detail (Shushan, 2020b). I am responding to the second one now. In interviews I am often pressured—sometimes persistently—to “admit” that deep down I truly believe that my work supports the survival hypothesis. This is something I have not done and will not do, regardless of the platform (whether an academic forum, a religious organization, or Coast to Coast radio). Instead, I reiterate that the survival issue is not relevant to my work, that I accept that do not know; and on a personal existential level, I am not even sure that I actually care.
As for Augustine’s specific issue with my article, I mentioned a stance he articulated in a 2007b article as an example of “promissory materialism.” In fact, it was not an original point to make at all, as the reference to Greyson (2007) indicated. Greyson first cited Augustine’s stance as an example of promissory materialism (albeit via reference to a different article), I cited Greyson while also providing a brief quote from Augustine, which I thought appropriately illustrated the characterization with specific relevance to cross-cultural NDEs.
Despite Augustine’s attempt to clarify his stance, however, I still see it as one of promissory materialism, which I defined briefly and specifically in relation to the subject of my article, as the position “that whatever might eventually be revealed by cross-cultural NDEs will inevitably reinforce a scientific materialist explanation.” I do not understand Augustine’s objection to that characterization. This is what I wrote on the subject in the article, in its entirety:
[Promissory materialism] is exemplified by Augustine’s (2007b, p. 116) statement that if NDEs prove to be universal, they “would be best explained in neuroscientific terms.”
An engagement with Augustine’s evidential and philosophical justification for this stance was not relevant to my purposes—I was merely citing him as an illustration of the stance. He took exception to the fact that I did not quote the passage in full, so here it is with the phrase I pulled italicized:
Given that at least some NDEs are known to be hallucinations (Augustine 2007[a]), should future cross-cultural studies uncover universal and well-defined NDE elements, such precise widespread commonalities would be best explained in neuroscientific terms. Alternatively, if extensive studies fail to uncover substantial cross-cultural consistency between NDE accounts, a sociological explanation for solely Western commonalities would be required. (Augustine, 2007b, p. 116)
In retrospect, I should perhaps have provided the full quote, for upon further consideration I see it as a dual example of promissory materialism. On the one hand, if NDEs prove to have universal features, they “would be best explained in neuroscientific terms.” On the other hand, if it turns out that NDEs do not have universal features, “a sociological explanation for solely Western commonalities would be required.” Our binary choice, then, is either neuroscientific or sociological, which are both materialist explanations. The claim is that regardless of what might be learned about cross-cultural NDEs in the future, the explanation will certainly not be metaphysical but rather one of these two materialist options. This is not “a foil” that I myself “created.” It is what Augustine wrote and it overtly signifies a basic promissory materialist claim “that whatever might eventually be revealed by cross-cultural NDEs will inevitably reinforce a scientific materialist explanation.” In other words, it is an a priori philosophical commitment, even if it is one that Augustine can support with philosophical arguments based on various kinds of evidence, such as the fact that some NDEs are hallucinatory. I acknowledge that my statement that “the mere fact of universality specifies neither a metaphysical nor a neuroscientific conclusion” was imprecise and may have unintentionally portrayed Augustine’s argument as less complex than it is, and I would happily delete those first four words. Otherwise, I fail to see the controversy.
I also acknowledge that my use of the phrase “fall back on” perhaps implied a value judgment; and “invoke” would have been the preferable, more neutral term. However, I would make exactly the same point about what we might call promissory metaphysicalism—i.e., that whatever might eventually be revealed by cross-cultural NDEs will inevitably reinforce a metaphysical explanation. Such an argument could be reasonably made by reference to the usual claims about veridical observations during OBEs, seeing people not known to have died, and/or philosophy and/or quantum physics, and so on. But no matter how well the argument is constructed, an argument does not constitute proof, so it would still be an example of promissory metaphysicalism. If I understand him correctly, because Augustine evidently believes that NDEs have been adequately explained by materialist hypotheses, he also believes that the evidence from cross-cultural NDEs will inevitably support his preexisting materialist beliefs. To him it is conviction, but to me it is promissory materialism.
I agree with Augustine that his own proposed binary choice between two eventual materialist explanations is “a perfectly reasonable thing to say about well-defined motifs found in reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) in the West, but peculiarly absent from the least contaminated non-Western NDE reports.” It is not, however, the only reasonable thing that might be said on the subject, and reasonableness of an argument does not make it true. Crucially, however, I did not criticize or argue against Augustine’s argument in the article and therefore I could not have “strawmanned” it as he claimed. I merely cited his stance as an example of one of the various ways people think about NDEs. It is precisely for this reason that I did not engage with his justifications for his stance and did not see it necessary to include his remark about hallucinations. This is a far cry from “a hit-and-run attack” on his work or “factitiously target[ing]” it “for special comment.” My brief remarks did not hold nearly such prominence in the article as Augustine is giving it.
Throughout the rest of the article, I mention the same kinds of issues that are problematic for the survival hypothesis that Augustine also mentions, such as failed prophecies. Had I been discussing only Western NDEs, I might also have mentioned children who see Santa Claus in the other world, or living teachers and relatives. (I know of no comparable cross-cultural instances.) There are also cross-cultural claims of NDErs bringing back physical objects from the otherworld, among many other alleged miracles that cross my NDE boggle threshold. One of the main points of my article is how the problems raised by looking at cross-cultural differences in NDE accounts impact (or should impact) near-death studies, regardless of which “side” a scholar is on. Despite cross-cultural similarities, the diversity of NDEs is such that an example can be found to support just about any argument, for or against survival.
I was also taken aback back by Augustine’s defensive and belittling tone. It is hardly collegial for him to express the hope that his article will give me “something to lose,” and to accuse me of acting from “baser impulses” that I should now keep in check as a result of his allegedly “setting the record straight.” The latter statement is ironic given Augustine’s comprehensive misunderstanding and total misrepresentation of me, my article, and my overall approach to the subject. These and other of his comments, it should be noted, were also directed at Dr. Andreas Sommer, a historian of the intersection of science, magic, and philosophy. I would like to point out that although Sommer is a respected colleague whose work I admire, I have not read his contribution to this journal, nor any of the other contributions. I had no idea who the other contributors might be when I wrote the article. I say this in case there is any perception that there was some monolithic or collaborative pro-survival agenda to the issue.
Having written all that, obviously my IRP article makes it clear that I do believe that cross-cultural NDEs are relevant to the survival hypothesis. My basic critique of near-death studies is that nearly all theorizing has been done on the assumption that a stereotypical Western model is representative of some universal human NDE. Such entirely Western-focused theorizing about a pan-human phenomenon essentially amounts to self-limiting ethnocentric speculation, for it applies only to a single largely Christian Anglophone segment of the world. I believe that arguments on both sides of the debate need to engage with the challenges presented by accounts from beyond that segment. No theory of NDEs can be truly persuasive and comprehensive if it does not address the phenomenon in all its similarity and diversity. Augustine and I likely agree on that point, and I was pleased to see that he did not take issue with my more substantive criticisms of his 2007b article concerning his perspectives on cross-cultural NDEs. There was, of course, a gap of two years between that article and my first book (Shushan, 2009 [rev. 2025]), but perhaps if he and other writers on the subject were to familiarize themselves in more depth with my body of peer-reviewed interdisciplinary scholarly work on cross-cultural NDEs, with which I have been engaged for over 25 years, it would enrich theorizing on the subject. With the exception of my IRP article, however, this has not been my purpose in undertaking the research. The interpretation of my work in relation to its relevance (or otherwise) for understanding the ontological nature of NDEs is up to others to determine, if they wish to take up that gauntlet.
I am aware that I have written far more here than Augustine did in his few paragraphs about my article. Because his misunderstandings were so fundamental despite my repeated attempts to make my approach clear, however, I wanted to address them in some detail in case others labored under similar misapprehensions.
References
Augustine, Keith. (2007a). “Near-Death Experiences with Hallucinatory Features.” Journal of Near-Death Studies Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall): 3-31.
Augustine, Keith (2007b). “Psychophysiological and Cultural Correlates Undermining a Survivalist Interpretation of Near-Death Experiences.” Journal of Near-Death Studies Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter): 89-125.
Augustine, Keith. (2024, December 8). “Are Survivalists Unable to Answer Their Critics?” The Secular Web. <https://infidels.org/library/modern/are-survivalists-unable-to-answer-their-critics/>.
Greyson, Bruce. (2007). “Commentary on ‘Psychophysiological and Cultural Correlates Undermining a Survivalist Interpretation of Near-Death Experiences’.” Journal of Near-Death Studies Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter): 127-145.
Shushan, Gregory. (2009) Conceptions of the Afterlife in Early Civilizations: Universalism, Constructivism, and Near-Death Experience. London, UK: Bloomsbury Continuum.
Shushan, Gregory. (2014). “Extraordinary Experiences and Religious Beliefs: Deconstructing Some Contemporary Philosophical Axioms.” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion Vol. 26, No. 4/5: 384-416.
Shushan, Gregory. (2018). Near-Death Experience in Indigenous Religions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Shushan, Gregory. (2020a). “Book Review: What is it Like to be Dead? Near-Death Experiences, Christianity, and the Occult by Jens Schlieter.” Journal of Near-Death Studies Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer): 101-131.
Shushan, Gregory. (2020b, June 19). “On the Study of NDEs: A Response to Episode 329 with Jens Schlieter and Christopher R. Cotter.” Religious Studies Project. <https://www.religiousstudiesproject.com/response/on-the-details-of-the-study-of-ndes/>.
Shushan, Gregory. (2024, October 3). “Diversity and Similarity of Near-Death Experiences across Cultures and History: Implications for the Survival Hypothesis.” International Review of Psychiatry online ahead-of-print, 1-7. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09540261.2024.2402429>.
Shushan, Gregory. (2025). Near-Death Experience in Ancient Civilizations. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions. [Revised, updated, and popularized edition of Shushan, 2009.]
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