Steven J. Conifer

The Argument from Consciousness Refuted (2001)

In an essay derived from his longer work "Mind-Brain Dependence as Twofold Support for Atheism," Conifer employs both rigorous informal argumentation and formal logic so as to thoroughly debunk the popular theistic argument that human consciousness entails God's existence. The essay includes a critical appraisal of the version of the argument put forward by the theistic philosopher Richard Swinburne.

The Argument from Reason for the Nonexistence of God (2001)

Conifer first formulates his (evidential) atheological argument as applied to the most common concept of deity and then assesses both various defenses of God's existence against the argument and several objections to those defenses. His thesis is that each of the defenses succumbs to at least one of the objections. He thus concludes that his is a forceful and cogent case for atheism with respect to the given concept of God.

A Critique of Fundamentalism (2000)

The author presents a philosophical critique of Christian fundamentalism by way of systematically dissecting two key chapters of a prominent fundamentalist tome. Toward the end of the essay he formulates an atheological argument directed at the deity in whom adherents of the given outlook profess a belief. He takes his argument to be a conclusive proof of that deity's nonexistence.

A Critique of Fundamentalism (II) (2002)

The author presents an extension of his essay "A Critique of Fundamentalism," in which he critiques chapters 1 and 5 of Henry M. Morris' and Martin E. Clark's The Bible Has the Answer.

Mind-Brain Dependence as Twofold Support for Atheism (2001)

Conifer presents a pair of parallel (evidential) atheological arguments whose basic premise appeals to the empirical and conceptual implausibility of disembodied consciousness. He critically examines and refutes numerous objections to his two arguments. Accordingly, he concludes that both of them constitute potent demonstrations of God's nonexistence.

Theological Noncognitivism Examined (2002) (Off Site)

Conifer examines theological noncognitivism, usually taken to be the view that the sentence "God exists" is cognitively meaningless, and concludes that if there is any version of noncognitivism that is true, then it has relevance only to the most esoteric forms of God-talk.