Should Atheists be Worried about Modal Calvinist Epistemology?
In the philosophy of religion, 'de jure objections' cover a wide variety of
arguments for the conclusion that theistic belief is rationally impermissible, whether or not God exists. 'Modal Calvinism' counters these objections by proposing that 'if God exists, God
would ensure that theistic belief is rationally compelling on a global scale', a modal conditional that is compatible with atheism. In this article Lok-Chi Chan and Shawn Standefer respond to this modal Calvinist argument by examining it through the lenses of probability, modality, and logic—particularly, with possible world semantics, Bayesian reasoning, and paraconsistent models. After examining various forms of the argument, we argue that none can compel atheists to believe that serious theistic possibilities worth considering would involve the purported divine measure. If successful, these arguments eliminate any significant threat from Alvin Plantinga's celebrated Warranted Christian Belief and block arguments that relativize reason by appealing to the presence of supernatural entities.