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(2026)

Part I: Establishing the Miscarriage Interpretation is Correct
     1.1 Introduction
     1.2 Piper’s Case
     1.3 General Problems
     1.4 Piper’s Five Points
Part II: The Bible and Abortion
     2.1 Possible Interpretations
     2.2 Other Biblical Arguments
     2.3 The Abortion Debate Today
Conclusion, and Why This All Matters

Appendix A: Others Verses

ABSTRACT: The consensus view in biblical scholarship is that Exodus 21:22-25 describes the death of a fetus from an induced miscarriage caused by the accidental strike of an assailant, and that this event was only punished with a fine. But many Internet webpages and even a few scholars assert a minority position—that the verse actually describes an induced premature birth in which the fetus lives. In this article Adam Taylor presents a summary of the reasons why this position is untenable. In order to sharpen the discussion, Taylor addresses the arguments of John Piper, an advocate of this minority view whose claims are frequently disseminated online by amateurs and laypersons. After a careful exegesis of Scripture, combined with considerations of various extent commentaries and the background context of the ancient Near East, Taylor establishes that Piper’s claims are false and that the consensus view is indeed correct. Taylor concludes with an exploration of possible interpretations of the verse and its potential relevance to the current abortion debate.

Part I

1.1 Introduction

The reversal of Roe v. Wade in June 2022, unsurprisingly, stirred renewed interest in the abortion debate. Perhaps even less surprisingly, renewed interest mounted in religious circles, particularly amongst Christians. The connection between religiosity and opposition to abortion is well documented. According to one study, those who feel they have a close relationship with God “are significantly more likely to oppose abortion” (Unnever, Bartkowski, & Cullen, 2010, p. 317). In the lead-up to Roe‘s reversal, surveys showed that the more religious someone is, “the more likely the individual is to say that abortion should be illegal in all circumstances” (Newport, 2022). When opposing abortion from a biblical standpoint, pro-life advocates frequently cite passages from Scripture which allegedly describe the unborn as human persons. However, such verses establish little in the way of fetal personhood, as they are largely poetic, nontechnical and nonliteral in nature, often focused on specific individuals rather than humanity as a whole (see Appendix A for examples). In the entire Bible, only one passage speaks of the unborn from a legal perspective, and potentially their status as a person. That passage is Exodus 21:22-25, and is the main focus of this article. For those unfamiliar, the passage in question, from the Revised Standard Version[1], reads as follows:

When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.

The issue at hand is how best to interpret this passage with regard to the personhood of the fetus, specifically in verse 22. At first glance, it suggests that if a fetus dies by way of induced miscarriage, the person who caused it is only punished with a fine, rather than death, the biblical penalty for killing a human (Exodus 21:12, Leviticus 24:17). Since they aren’t charged under the “lex talionis” (law of retaliation) mandate of “life for life”[2], the implication then is that a fetus is not regarded as valid human life.

Naturally, this has significant implications for the abortion debate from a biblical standpoint. After all, how can the Bible be used to oppose abortion if the Bible itself appears to value fetuses as less than human? While many arguments are mounted against this interpretation, one of the most popular is to claim the passage simply doesn’t describe the fetus dying at all. Instead, it’s argued the fetus actually survives an induced, premature birth in verse 22. The fine imposed, it’s further argued, is for causing said birth, and death is indeed the punishment given if the fetus dies in verse 23. Compounding the problem is that different Bibles translate verse 22 differently, with many indeed describing a miscarriage, while others suggest a premature birth.[3] So which interpretation is correct? To answer this, we must look beyond mere translations and consider arguments mounted for and against the miscarriage interpretation.

1.2 Piper’s Case

In order to focus this discussion, we will mainly engage with the arguments of theologian John Piper. Piper is a well-known pastor, biblical scholar, and founder of the website Desiring God. In an article published in 1989, Piper performs exegesis of Exodus 21:22-25, and draws the following conclusion:

There is no miscarriage in this text. The child is born pre-maturely and is protected with the same sanctions as the mother. If the child is injured there is to be recompense as with the injury of the mother. (Piper, 1989)

Before engaging directly with his specific claims, it’s important to first establish the current state of the debate in biblical scholarship regarding this text. The consensus view amongst scholars has been, and continues to be, that Exodus 21:22 does indeed describe a miscarriage.[4] More generally speaking, a great number of scholars of varying religious backgrounds—e.g., Robert Alter, Cheryl Anderson, Hector Avalos, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Richard Carrier, John J. Collins, Shawna Dolansky, Bart Ehrman, Peter Enns, Richard Elliott Friedman, Russell Fuller, Zev Garber, Jacobus Wilhelm Gericke, Eric Harvey, Joel M. Hoffman, Ronit Irshai, J. Gerald Janzen, Margaret Kamitsuka, Yung Suk Kim, Scott Langston, T. M. Lemos, Dan McClellan, Thomas F. McDaniel, Eckart Otto, Shalom Paul, Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte, Daniel Schiff, Paul D. Simmons, Joe M. Sprinkle, Jeffrey H. Tigay, John H. Walton, Roy Bowen Ward, Thomas White, Patricia Wilson-Kastner, David Wright—agree that the fate of fetus described in this verse is death.[5] To be sure, they all disagree on what conclusion should be drawn from this, but all agree the fetus does in fact die.

While Piper’s position is thus in the minority, this hasn’t stopped amateurs and other like-minded lay-persons from repeating it. Indeed, a casual Internet search shows just how commonly Piper’s view has been repeated and uncritically disseminated online:

“What in the context justifies our assumption that the child that ‘comes forth’ is dead? The answer is, nothing does.” —Greg Koukl (2013)

“[Exodus 21:22] just means that the child comes out of the womb. If we stick to this plain reading, the passage is distinguishing between a blow that results in the child coming out without injury and a blow that results in the child coming out with an injury.” —Luke Wayne (2016)

“One way to interpret the passage is that if the woman is caused to have an early delivery, then the penalty is a fine, but any further injury to the child is covered under the lex talionis law of ‘an eye for an eye.'” —Trent Horn (2019)

“There is no justification for translating verse 22 to refer to a miscarriage…. The expression used suggests the birth of a child. The irregularity is the birth is prematurely and maliciously induced.” —Jay Craig (2021)

“[D]uring this fight her child was brought forth or came out and was simply born early—there is absolutely no indication that the child died.” —Michele Hendrickson (2021)

Even beyond Internet-based claims, the view that the fetus lives is also found in more scholarly circles, in publications repeating arguments similar to those made by Piper.[6]

The choice to engage Piper’s article specifically is motivated by several factors. First, the article is freely available online, allowing readers ease of access and the ability to compare the arguments presented there with the critical review outlined here. Second, regardless of whether he’s right or wrong, Piper composes his case well, outlining his arguments clearly and helpfully in concise bullet points. Third, while the article is over 30 years old, a comparison of what he argues there with more recent discussions shows little disparity, both in quality and specific points raised. In other words, the arguments against the consensus view have indeed changed very little in three decades.

In addition to addressing his specific claims, we will also consider his overall methodology in building his case. While there is much Piper discusses, there is also much he doesn’t, omitting relevant data which, as a result, has evidently led him to his mistaken belief. All of this is done not only to provide a proper exegesis of Exodus 21:22-25, but also to act as a guide for potential future discussion of the passage. While this acts as a critical review, it can also be read independently of Piper’s article.

1.3 General Problems

Before considering Piper’s specific arguments, it’s important to first outline the general problems with his approach, while at the same time establishing relevant information and evidence that leads most scholars to conclude that the miscarriage interpretation is the correct one. As we will see, Piper’s conclusions are born not only from a flawed exegesis, but also his omission of relevant data and context beyond the Exodus text itself. With that said, there are at least eight problems with Piper’s approach in need of comment.

First, Piper’s analysis focuses exclusively on the Hebrew Masoretic Text of the passage. Consequently, he fails to consider the Greek translation found in the Septuagint. This is a serious omission, as the Septuagint is often regarded as much as a commentary on the text as a translation. It should go without saying that the ancient Rabbinical authors who translated their texts understood them better than we ever could, and thus their views need to be considered. The translation in question reads:

Now if two men fight and strike a pregnant woman and her child comes forth not fully formed, he shall be punished with a fine. According as the husband of the woman might impose, he shall pay with judicial assessment. But if it is fully formed, he shall pay life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for would, stripe for stripe. (Perkins, 2009, p. 66)

This version of the passage sheds more light on its potential true meaning. First, we see the focus is placed squarely on the fetus with regard to any damage inflicted. Furthermore, we see the severity of punishment is determined by the developmental stage the fetus has reached, wherein a “fully formed” fetus requires “life for life,” whereas a “not fully formed” one only warrants a fine. This will all be important later.

Second, because he omits mention of the Septuagint translation, Piper also fails to mention Philo of Alexandria’s reading of the text. Philo’s reading, per the Loeb Classical Library, is as follows:

If a man comes to blows with a pregnant woman and strikes her on the belly and she miscarries, then, if the result of the miscarriage is unshaped and undeveloped, he must be fined both for the outrage and for obstructing the artist Nature in her creative work of bringing into life the fairest of living creatures, man. But, if the offspring is already shaped and all the limbs have their proper qualities and places in the system, he must die, for that which answers to this description is a human being, which he has destroyed in the laboratory of Nature who judges that the hour has not yet come for bringing it out into the light, like a statue lying in a studio requiring nothing more than to be conveyed outside and released from confinement. (Colson, 1937/1998, p. 545)

This sheds even more light on the matter. Not only is the focus once again squarely on the fetus, Philo also understood the outcome of the attack to be a miscarriage[7], and that the punishment to follow was based on the developmental stage the fetus reached. Specifically, the fetus’ death was only considered a capital crime when “all the limbs have their proper qualities and places in the system.” This is what “fully formed” meant. Before this, however, when it was “unshaped and undeveloped,” only a fine was required, because at this stage the fetus was not regarded as a human being.

Third, in addition to Philo’s reading, Piper also fails to mention that every Jewish commentary in antiquity written on Exodus affirms that verse 22 describes a miscarriage. As Piper is undoubtedly aware, commentaries on Scripture are hardly modern inventions, and if the verse truly speaks of a premature birth, then surely at least one of them would describe it as such. And yet none do. Instead, in addition to the Septuagint and Philo, every other ancient Jewish commentary says the verse describes a miscarriage, including that of Josephus, Targum Onkelos, the Mekhilta, and the Talmud.[8]

Fourth, Piper omits the fact that laws similar to what’s described in Exodus 21:22-25 are also found in pre-Old Testament legal texts from other surrounding cultures of the Ancient Near East (Paul, 2005, p. 71). Abundant scholarship establishes that the other ANE cultures had significant influence on the laws in the Old Testament, evidenced by the substantial number of parallels between their texts (Otto, 1993; Gericke, 2003, pp. 201-253; Wright, 2009). As to highlight this point, consider the following legislation found in the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (LL), the Sumerian Law Exercise Tablet (SLEx), and the Laws of Hammurabi (LH)[9], compared to Exodus 21:

LL (ca. 1930 BCE)	SLEx (ca. 1800 BCE)	LH (ca. 1750 BCE)	Exodus (ca. 600 BCE)
d “If [a (male)] strikes the daughter of a man and causes her to lose her fetus, he shall weigh and deliver 30 shekels of silver.” e “If she dies, that male shall be killed.”	1 “If he jostles the daughter of a man and causes her to miscarry her fetus, he shall weigh and deliver 10 shekels of silver.” 2 “If he strikes the daughter of a man and causes her to miscarry her fetus, he shall weigh and deliver 20 shekels of silver.”	209 “If an awïlu strikes a woman of the awïlu-class and thereby causes her to miscarry her fetus, he shall weigh and deliver 10 shekels of silver for her fetus.” 210 “If that woman should die, they shall kill his daughter.”	21:22 “When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine.” 21:23 “If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life.”

Without question, these other ANE texts describe both the loss of a fetus and monetary compensation for causing said loss. The idea that Exodus 21 is describing something different is thus quite implausible. Likewise, other ANE miscarriage laws, such as the Hittite Laws (HL), even specified a monetary amount based on the stage of pregnancy, (Roth, 1995, p. 219) in line with the Septuagint reading of Exodus.

Fifth, Piper assumes the fetus lives as a result of being prematurely born, yet fails to consider how implausible this would be from a medical standpoint. For example, Robert Congdon, a trained physician, notes that any strike that could induce a premature birth would have to be quite severe, and the subsequent harm could only be properly treated by modern medicine and medical techniques (1989, pp. 140-143). Furthermore, he notes that an infant’s lungs are typically not developed enough to survive on its own until around 33 to 34 weeks, and that outside of a hospital setting, infants born before then would most likely die. As he concludes, “If medical data has anything to say about Exodus 21:22, it indicates that the overwhelming probability for such a situation is an outcome of trauma-induced abortion with fetal demise” (Congdon, 1989, p. 142). Yung Suk Kim concurs, noting that “If we consider relatively poor medical advancement in ancient society, we can assume easily that the possibility of premature birth would be rare” (2006, p. 8).

Sixth, the scenario Piper envisions, a fine being imposed for causing a premature birth, makes little sense in the wider context of the Old Testament. As Dan McClellan notes, “Fines are imposed where there is real material or monetary loss, not where one could imagine that the premature birth of a healthy baby could impose some slight inconvenience” (2025, pp. 99-100). Indeed, whenever fines are imposed in the Old Testament, it’s to either make amends for damage to property (such as livestock or chattel slaves; Exodus 21:28-34), or situations of theft (Exodus 22:1). A fine imposed for causing real material loss, such as a miscarriage, fits comfortably in this line of thought, whereas one imposed for causing someone to give birth early doesn’t, and has no valid parallel anywhere else in the Bible.[10]

Seventh, for all his hermeneutics, Piper fails to consider the meaning behind the word “hurt”/”strike” used in this verse. The word used is nagaph, which appears another 48 times elsewhere in the Old Testament. And in every instance, the word is always used in reference to lethal damage (Nagasawa, 2022b). This contrasts with nakah, a more generic term that appears over 500 times in Scripture, and could mean either a lethal strike or one that merely causes harm. The author of Exodus could have used either of these words, yet chose the one more directly associated with death. The implication, then, is that when it’s used in verse 22, someone or something dies, and it’s clearly not the woman.

Eighth, in forming his opinion on the Exodus text, Piper relies, in part, on Carl Keil and Franz Delitzsch’s Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament, and George Bush’s Notes on the Book of Exodus. Both of these works are over a hundred years old, and were so at the time his article was written. It’s generally considered poor practice to cite such outdated scholarship today, as the methodology of historical analysis was comparatively inferior in many ways before the 1950s (Carrier, 2014, pp. 11-14). What scholars had to say about Exodus 21 in the mid-to-late 1800s has little to no bearing on current scholarship, and Piper’s position was still in the minority at the time he wrote his article (Gorman, 1996, p. 150, cf. Simmons, 1982, pp. 25-27).

To be sure, no one of these points necessarily refutes Piper’s case, but cumulatively they present a devastating challenge to it. Accordingly, any positive evidence he presents to counter these points would have to be quite substantial. That said, we now turn our attention to his evidence.

1.4 Piper’s Five Points

As we shall see, Piper’s case is built primarily on hermeneutics of verse 22, contrasting the language used there with words used elsewhere in the Bible. Already this approach is on shaky ground, as Douglas Stuart notes that the wording of verse 22 “is without parallel elsewhere in the Old Testament” (2006, p. 491). Thus, Piper’s analysis must be thoroughly compelling in order to justify his assertion that Exodus 21 describes a live birth, rather than a miscarriage, as the consensus of scholars maintain. In doing so, he presents his own translation on which his interpretation is based:

And when men fight and strike a pregnant woman and her children go forth, and there is no injury, he shall surely be fined as the husband of the woman may put upon him; and he shall give by the judges. But if there is injury, you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.

This translation appears reasonable, closer to the literal translation of the original Hebrew.[11] Therefore, we will accept Piper’s translation for the time being. Even “playing by his rules,” so to speak, it’s possible to demonstrate how flawed his exegesis really is, and why the verse simply does not describe a live birth. In making his case to the contrary, Piper breaks up his arguments into five bullet points:

(1) Piper begins by first noting that the word for “miscarry,” shakol or shakal, is not used in verse 22. Instead, the word yatsa is used which, as he will later note, means “coming out” or “going forth.” However, by his own admission, shakol/shakal has several meanings throughout Scripture. While there are four instances of the word being translated as “miscarriage” or “miscarry” (Genesis 31:38, Exodus 23:26, Job 21:10, Hosea 9:14), two cases refer to “barrenness” (2 Kings 2:19, 21), one case refers to “desolation” (Ezekiel 14:15), and one case refers to child killing (1 Samuel 15:33). By far, the most common use of the word is “bereavement,” and often not in a specific way.[12] Given such varied use, it’s incorrect to say that shakol/shakal necessarily provides a contrasting meaning to yatsa which, as we’ll see, has its own varied meanings throughout Scripture.

(2) As Piper correctly notes, yatsa is often used in the Bible to denote a live birth (e.g., Genesis 25:25–26, 38:28, 29, 30, Job 1:21, Jeremiah 1:5), and nowhere else to describe a miscarriage. However, rather than strictly denoting “birth,” the word more generically just means “coming out” or “going forth,” and more often than not has nothing to do with birth (e.g., Genesis 8:7, 16, 17, 18, 19, 9:10, 10:11, 12:5, Exodus 2:11, 13, 4:14, 5:10, 7:15, etc.). There is another word, however, which specifically denotes ordinary live birth, yalad, but is absent from verse 22. “Arguments from silence,” such as the one Piper employs, are thus unconvincing to observers such as Joseph Sprinkle, who notes that it can be “turned on its head” by proposing one in response: “why did the author not use the ordinary word for a live birth [yalad], if he had that in mind, rather than the more ambiguous [yatsa] (‘came out’)?” (Sprinkle, 1993, p. 249) Furthermore, as Russell Fuller points out, other ANE texts, such as the laws of Hammurabi and the Middle Assyrian laws, also utilized generic terms to describe miscarriages (e.g., “to cast,” “to drop,” “cast down”) (Fuller, 1994, p. 182). As a general rule, mere genericness does not preclude a word from having multiple meanings—indeed, that is precisely what broadens its use in the first place. This was true of words used throughout the ANE, and clearly true of the Hebrew language as well.

And contra Piper, there is at least one other instance of yatsa being used in the context of a dead infant, Numbers 12:12: “Let her not be as one dead, of whom the flesh is half consumed when he comes out of his mother’s womb.” Granted, most commentators agree this likely refers to a stillbirth, rather than a miscarriage or abortion.[13] Regardless, its use here shows that it could indeed be used in reference to a dead infant, and thus not always to “ordinary live birth,” as Piper insists.[14] Given such varied use, Piper has not justified his implication that the meaning of yatsa was so restrained that it couldn’t encompass “miscarriage” as well.[15]

(3) Piper then makes another “argument from silence,” pointing out that neither golem, the word for “embryo,” nor nephel, the word for “untimely birth,” “miscarriage,” or “stillborn,” are used in verse 22. Here too his hermeneutics is flawed, merely saying what’s not in the verse, without justifying why those words should be used. As we’ll see, a case can be made that neither of those words should be used in verse 22 based on context, something Piper simply hasn’t dealt with adequately.

For starters, not only is golem the only word that’s translated as “embryo” (lit. “unformed substance”)[16], it’s also only used once in the entire Bible, in Psalm 139:16. Already this should give us pause, since this means the word is never used anywhere else to describe the unborn, nor verses that unquestionably speak of pregnancy loss. Yet Piper finds nothing anomalous about that. The word’s absence from verses that discuss literal pregnancy loss may speak to the fact that the Psalms are largely poetic verses, intended as hymns speaking to God’s creative power. They employ heavy use of figurative language, such as metaphor (e.g., “The Lord is my rock, and my fortress,” “The Lord is my shepherd;” Psalm 18:2, 23:1), personification (e.g., “when the waters saw thee, they were afraid,” “Let the floods clap their hands; let the hills sing for joy together;” Psalm 77:16, 98:8), simile (e.g., “As a hart longs for flowing streams, so longs my soul for thee, O God;” Psalm 42:1), and hyperbole (e.g., “They have all fallen away; they are all alike depraved; there is none that does good, no, not one;” Psalm 53:3). If one wishes to argue for a literal reading of any of the psalms, including 139:16, thorough justification is therefore needed, rather than just quoting them verbatim.

With this in mind, the absence of golem in verse 22 is, in fact, no great mystery at all. Exodus 21 is primarily concerned with prescribing laws which speak to both the moral and legal ramifications of one’s actions, in a very literal sense. And if Piper finds it relevant that golem is absent from verse 22, he must then explain why it is absent from anywhere else in the Bible where pregnancy loss is discussed. That a verse which discusses judicial consequences regarding literal pregnancy loss lacks language evidently deemed more appropriate for figurative, nonliteral hymns does not seem even remotely surprising.

As far as nephel‘s absence, this is also no cause for concern. Nephel appears only three times, in Job 3:16, Psalm 58:8, and Ecclesiastes 6:3. A review of these verses shows that in each case, the word is being used in a figurative sense, describing one as “like an untimely birth.” This again contrasts with the very literal, legal prescriptions described throughout Exodus. Furthermore, the word is only ever used in the context of a normal miscarriage and/or stillbirth; i.e., in the natural biological sense. But what Exodus 21 describes is neither natural nor normal. That the author of Exodus didn’t use nephel in verse 22, therefore, may simply have been because they didn’t find it appropriate or necessary.

(4) Piper next notes that an ordinary word for children is used, yeladeiha, which he claims “regularly refers to children who are born and never to one miscarried.” Yeladeiha is a plural form of the noun yeled, which typically means “child.” The argument that the word’s use implies a live birth, however, is not particularly compelling.[17] Consider that, were we to take the word’s use here literally, it implies multiple births result from an assailant’s strike. Recall our discussion of the medical implausibility of a newborn surviving a premature birth, especially one induced by a violent attack. The idea of multiple live births resulting from an assailant’s strike is even less plausible. Moreover, if the idea conveyed really is that the penalty is for causing a premature birth, referring to multiple births in the law seems unnecessary to make the point. A more plausible reason for the word’s use, according to Sprinkle, is that it acts as a plural abstraction to denote “the product of her womb,” and notes that it would be “an apt term for an inadequately developed baby” (1993, p. 249). Likewise, laws of other ANE cultures used similar abstractions to describe a fetus (e.g., “that of her womb”) (Fuller, 1994, p. 183). Thus the word’s use in reference to a miscarriage seems quite reasonable, while the premature birth view introduces several complications and seems out of place contextually.

(5) Finally, Piper takes issue with certain translations, such as the 1972 NASB, which render the verse “her children go forth and there is no further injury.” He notes that “further” is not in the original text. Likewise, he suggests that both the fetus and woman are in view with regard to the strike and the harm done, since the Hebrew lah is absent, which would have rendered the verse “her children go forth and there is no injury to her.” As far as literal reading, Piper is right on both counts. However, such hermeneutics considers the verse too literally, and again ignores the finer context of what’s being conveyed.

For starters, we have the use of nagaph to describe the strike, which we noted earlier was always used in reference to lethal harm. Again, its use in verse 22 implies someone or something dies, and since it’s clearly not the woman, the only other candidate is indeed the fetus.[18] This would explain why, contextually, the use of “further” would be justified, for though it is not literally there, its use would be quite appropriate to denote the fetus’ death, but no further damage done to the woman.[19] This in turn would also explain why lah was not used to specify the woman in either verse 22 or 23. If verse 22 already establishes that the fetus dies, there would be no need to specify the woman any further, as only her death in verse 23 warrants the “lex talionis” mandate of life for life.[20]

Additionally, because Piper fails to consider the other ANE cultures’ laws, he overlooks the fact that while penalties were imposed for causing miscarriages, none were imposed for causing premature births.[21] Thus, if the author of Exodus 21 were referring to premature birth, they would be introducing a law wholly new to readers, who at that point would have been most familiar with the laws of the ANE. Whereas, if they were prescribing laws similar to those of the surrounding cultures, and understood the readers’ familiarity with them, then the use of general language without qualifiers would make sense. Only if the author were introducing an entirely new law would qualifiers such as lah be needed to specify the woman (or, for that matter, a more specific word for “birth,” such as yalad). The use of “further” in verse 22, in certain translations, is thus quite reasonable, and the absence of qualifiers specifying the woman makes sense in the context of the surrounding cultures.

As we can see, Piper’s case against the miscarriage interpretation is wildly problematic and effectively groundless. The simplest way to describe his error is that he considers Exodus 21:22-25 in a vacuum, failing to properly consider the context from surrounding cultures, early Jewish commentaries, and even certain context from the Bible itself. As a result, his exegesis is arguably hyper-literal, reading the text as plainly as possible without considering the disparate valences between words used in biblical times with corresponding words used today. In light of everything we’ve discussed, it’s safe to conclude that the consensus position in biblical scholarship stands: Exodus 21:22-25 does indeed describe a miscarriage.[22]

Part II: The Bible and Abortion

2.1 Possible Interpretations

The goal thus far has been to provide an overview of the reasons why scholars, by and large, agree that Exodus 21:22 describes a miscarriage, rather than a premature birth. For the remainder of this article, our purposes will be to explore plausible interpretations of the text with regard to the fetus’ status, and the implications this possibly has on the modern abortion debate. Note that I do not claim to have settled the dispute over the text’s true meaning, nor what broader impact it may have in political discourse. Generally speaking, and in proper accordance with the separation of church and state[23], my personal viewpoint is that the prescriptions set forth in religious texts should have no direct bearing on matters of public policy anyway. Still, determining the text’s true meaning is an interesting exegetical question, and while no political impact is ensured (or even warranted), it may at least give those of a religious pro-life persuasion reason to reconsider their own views with regard to fetal personhood.

The main issue at hand in interpreting Exodus 21:22-25 is that we have what at first appears to be two conflicting translations: the Hebrew Masoretic Text (MT) and the Greek Septuagint (LXX).[24] Rather than requoting them, the following simplified summaries are offered:

• (MT): If an assailant strikes a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry, but lives herself, the assailant only has to pay a fine. If the strike kills not only the fetus but the woman too, then the assailant is given the death penalty.

• (LXX): If an assailant strikes a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry, and the fetus is not fully developed, the assailant is only charged with a fine. If the fetus is fully developed, then the assailant is given the death penalty.

Right away we see where the conflict between these translations lies. The MT specifies that only the woman’s death requires “life for life,” whereas the fetus’ death only warrants a fine. In contrast, the LXX specifies that the penalty for causing the fetus’ death is determined by its stage of development; a fine if it’s underdeveloped, and life for life it’s fully developed. The fate of the woman is not a factor. The question is, which of these readings is correct? The simplest answer, of course, would be to accept the MT and leave it at that. However, this option may be too simple, as it assumes that the author of the MT warrants greater authority than the Rabbinical scholars who translated the Septuagint, which seems unjustified. Moreover, we need to account for why those scholars and Philo of Alexandria interpreted the text the way they did. And while the surrounding ANE laws help to establish Exodus is indeed referring to a miscarriage, they fail give higher credence to either interpretation since, as we’ve seen, some specify penalties based on the fetus’ age, while others do not. Since we are discussing a Jewish text, it may serve us to consider what other early Jewish sources had to say about it.

For example, the first century historian Josephus gave his own interpretation in his Antiquities of the Jews, evidently of the MT:

He that kicks a woman with child, so that the woman miscarry, let him pay a fine in money, as the judges shall determine, as having diminished the multitude by the destruction of what was in her womb; and let money also be given [to] the woman’s husband by him that kicked her; but if she die of the stroke, let him also be put to death, the law judging it equitable that life should go for life. (Antiquities of the Jews 4.278)

As this reading makes clear, Josephus considered an assailant’s strike a capital crime only if it killed the woman, in line with the MT. In other words, Josephus and the MT didn’t consider the fetus’ death to be murder at any stage of pregnancy. Moreover, Josephus’ interpretation is found in later Jewish writings, such as Targum Onkelos and the Talmud.[25]

The implications this may have for the abortion debate would be significant. Josephus’ reading suggests abortion would never be considered a capital crime, regardless of the fetus’ gestational stage, something even many pro-choice advocates may find too extreme. An important caveat, however, is that in later writings, Josephus appears to contradict this view somewhat. In his Against Apion (2.202), he notes that “the law … forbids women to cause abortion of what is begotten, or to destroy it afterward.” The “law” Josephus refers to is unfortunately ambiguous, but an understanding of his priorities may well account for this seeming contradiction. For starters, he notes that only the woman is forbidden to seek out and cause an abortion, but says nothing about her husband. Josephus, who by this point had defected to the Romans, may have been reflecting the Roman attitude towards abortion, which was generally allowed with essentially no restrictions (Hornblower, Spawforth, & Eidinow, 2012, s.v. “abortion”). There was, however, evidently one exception; whether the woman sought an abortion without her husband’s permission. Doing so was considered grounds for divorce, and even exile in some cases (Jones, 2004, pp. 39, 42). Thus between his Antiquities and Against Apion, Josephus may very well be reflecting Roman biases.

Moreover, Josephus’ view clearly deviates from the earlier Rabbinical interpretation found in the Septuagint, which specified a capital crime took place based on how developed the fetus was. As we’ve seen, Philo endorsed this view, and specified that killing a fetus “unshaped and undeveloped” only warranted a fine, rather than death. Furthermore, he explained that while the fetus still “adhered” to its mother’s womb, it was considered part of the woman, and that this was the view of scientists and physicians of his time. Only when it was “brought to the birth” did he consider it officially a human being (Colson, 1937/1998, pp. 549, 551).

While the LXX stipulates that only a fully formed fetus’ death warranted “life for life,” the question then is, what exactly does “fully formed” mean in this context? Unfortunately, the LXX doesn’t make this clear. Whereas Philo specified that “fully formed” meant “all the limbs have their proper qualities and places in the system.” Even this is not entirely clear, and we shouldn’t expect ancient writers to have been able to specify development stages with the degree of accuracy modern medical techniques afford us today. Nonetheless, we can perhaps glean possible interpretations from the LXX and Philo’s words, if only tentatively.

Originating with Aristotle, the common Greek viewpoint was that an embryo/fetus was considered fully formed at 40 days post-conception for males, and 90 days post-conception for females (Cahill, 1995). Later Jewish texts, such as the Mishnah and the Talmud, adopted a similar view, stating that if a woman miscarried before the fortieth day, the embryo was considered “merely water” (Irshai, 2023). While it would be straightforward to assume this is the intended meaning expressed in the LXX and by Philo, there are reasons to consider this view with caution. After all, certain criteria outlined by Philo appear not to entirely align with this, such as his stipulation that the limbs of the fetus “have their proper qualities and places in the system.” Even by 40 days, the embryo only has what are considered “buds;” structures that will become arms and legs (SDDoH, 1995, p. 7). Likewise, his stipulation that only when it’s “brought to birth” does it become a human would also contradict this since, whether at 40 or 90 days, a fetus born that early would never survive. Since there is some question of whether this Aristotelian view is consistent with what the LXX and Philo suggest[26], we can consider other possible timeframes as well, albeit also tentatively.

Bert Peerbolte, for example, suggests Philo’s criteria implies a fetus at around 16 weeks was considered fully formed (Peerbolte, 2016, p. 53), which corresponds to when the legs are developing and the fetus’ sex can be determined (SDDoH, 1995, p. 12).[27] Alternatively, if we interpret Philo’s words to mean when limbs are fully formed, then this would refer to a minimum of 22 weeks, by which point the arms are in proportion to the body and the lower limbs (legs) are fully formed (SDDoH, 1995, p. 17). If something like this is what Philo and the LXX had in mind, the implications are interesting. For one thing, this figure is close to the onset of the third trimester, the viability cut-off point originally established by Roe of around 24 weeks.[28] It also corresponds closely to when major medical bodies, such as the American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, recommend abortions should not be carried out, except in cases of significant medical complications.[29] It’s also close to around when many pro-choice advocates believe the cut-off point for elective abortions should be (~20 to 24 weeks).[30] And according to neurological studies, it’s around this time when major cerebral activity begins, which in turn is when the fetus truly becomes conscious and able to experience pain.[31] Therefore, the Septuagint, Philo’s interpretation, and our knowledge of modern science suggests that, were abortion policy determined by biblical standards, only what we might call a “late-term” abortion could be seen as a capital offense.[32]

Still another possible interpretation is that “fully formed” meant that not only did the fetus need to look recognizably human, but that it also had to come out of the womb alive. According to extent Jewish texts, such as the Mishnah and the Talmud, a baby was considered truly alive when its head exited its mother’s womb.[33] Granted, the Mishnah and the Talmud date to around 200 and 500 CE, respectively, well after Exodus was composed. Yet this view is consistent with Philo’s stipulation that only when a baby was “brought to the birth” was it considered a human. Likewise, the view that life begins when the head emerges is consistent with the Bible’s view that life begins when one takes their first breath. Specifically, we read in Genesis 2:7 that once God breathed the “breath of life” into Adam, only then did he become a living being (Dolansky, 2023). Given that Adam acts as the archetype for all of humanity, it’s reasonable to assume this “breath of life” concept applies to all humans as well (Walton, 2015, pp. 74-77). In sum, the possible inference we can draw from Genesis, Philo, and the Mishnah/Talmud is that a newborn was only considered fully formed when (1) it appeared recognizably human, and (2) it came out alive and took its first breath.[34] In turn, this means that were the fetus to die at any stage while in the womb, its death would never be considered that of a human being.

To be sure, this all assumes the LXX is the correct reading of the text; but is it? Without direct access to the minds of the people who originally composed both the Hebrew and Greek, it may not be possible to answer this question definitively. Nevertheless, there are, to the best of my knowledge, at least two ways in which the LXX may be harmonized with the MT in a way that there is actually no contradiction between them at all. The first, suggested by Thomas McDaniel (2012), is that the MT originally did stipulate that the penalty for causing a miscarriage was based on the fetus’ gestational stage, but this meaning was lost in translation. Specifically, McDaniel explains that the cognate for the word “harm” (ason) was originally related to the concept of being “full-grown in body” and being “of regular build and growth,” which fits perfectly with the LXX’s notion of a fetus being fully or not fully formed. The Hebrew we have now, and its disparate translations, is thus the result of a minor etymological corruption. As he concludes:

The Septuagint translators understood correctly the meaning of Exod 21:22-23 which states quite clearly that a fully developed fetus was a person protected by the lex talionis, but a fetus which was not fully formed was not a person but was a property properly protected by the lex pensitationis. (McDaniel, 2012, p. 10)

Even without this textual consideration, there is another way the MT, on its own as we have it, might well be in line with the LXX’s meaning. While the word ason can be translated as “harm,” it also vaguely just means “evil.” Thus, the verse can be read as “if her child comes out and there is no evil” (Ra, 2016, pp. 61-62). If the “evil” here refers to murder, as verses 22 and 23 certainly suggest, this could simply mean that “evil” takes place only if an actual human dies. That is, if “harm” or “evil” just means a viable human dies, this could mean that a capital crime takes place only if the fetus dies and was developed enough to be considered a human. “There is no evil,” therefore, could mean there was no death of a viable human in verse 22, and thus “life for life” wasn’t warranted. Whereas, if “evil” take place in verse 23, this could refer to the baby dying and being developed enough to be considered a human, which in turn would warrant the “life for life” penalty.

Finally, it’s worth noting that the notion of assigning value based on one’s development and age wasn’t exactly a foreign idea to the ancient Israelites. For example, we find in Leviticus 27 that God assigned monetary value to humans based on their age and sex. Respectively, he assigned fifteen and ten shekels of silver for men and women aged over sixty, fifty and thirty shekels for men and women aged between twenty and sixty, twenty and ten shekels for men and women aged five to twenty, and five and three shekels for men and women aged between one month and five years. No value is given for infants aged under one month. Similarly, we find in Numbers that when a census was taken among the Israelites, only those aged one month and older were included (Numbers 3:15-16, 40; cf. Peerbolte, 2016, pp. 52-53). To be sure, none of this suggests necessarily that the Bible considered those under the age of one month less than human (indeed, the LXX reading of Exodus 21:23, if correct, suggests just the opposite), but it does show that monetary value based on age was very much biblical, in line with the concept outlined in the LXX.

It bears reiterating that I don’t consider this dispute resolved, and that Exodus 21:22-25’s true meaning has not been definitively established. Admittedly, based on the data discussed, I lean slightly more in favor of the LXX accurately capturing the verse’s intended meaning, but this is only a tentative conclusion. However, what seems beyond reasonable dispute is that the verse is describing anything other than a miscarriage. Regardless of the disparity over what criteria warrants certain penalties, the consistent thread running throughout the various readings is that verse 22 describes the fetus dying, and the punishment to follow merely being a fine. Were we to accept Piper and other authors’ claims to the contrary, we’re left with a rather odd timeline of events. It means accepting that the surrounding cultures prescribed laws regarding induced miscarriage, followed by Exodus, which introduced a law previously unheard of regarding premature birth, but worded similarly to the miscarriage laws. In turn, various commentators, including the Septuagint translators, Philo, Josephus, Targum Onkelos, the Mekhilta, the Talmud, and virtually every scholar up until John Calvin, (Fuller, 1994, pp. 183-184) all interpreted Exodus 21:22 as describing a miscarriage. Is it logical to assume this timeline is correct? Or, is it more logical to assume that the miscarriage interpretation was correct all along, and that Exodus simply follows suit in a long line of Ancient Near Eastern legislation requiring monetary compensation for causing a miscarriage? In light everything so far discussed, the preponderance of evidence renders the former option utterly untenable.

2.2 Other Biblical Arguments

From a biblical standpoint, opponents of abortion have expended most of their energy interpreting verse 22 as describing a premature birth, rather than a miscarriage, and it’s easy to understand why. No doubt many recognize the implications of the miscarriage interpretation—that if causing a miscarriage only warranted a fine, rather than life for life, the fetus would seem to be regarded as less valuable than a human life. Against this, the premature birth argument is doubtless the most popular, but it’s certainly not the only one, and while Piper doesn’t offer any of them, others have. Even granting the miscarriage interpretation, opponents of abortion rights argue this still wouldn’t demonstrate the Bible considers the unborn less valuable than birthed humans, nor would it allow abortions done today. In this section, we will consider some of these arguments and show them to be just as groundless as those claiming verse 22 describes a premature birth. In doing so, several factors regarding the Exodus text will also be discussed which, when properly considered, suggest the text has at least some relevance to modern abortions.

For starters, some make the point that simply because any penalty at all is imposed for killing a fetus, that alone shows the act is wrong and the Bible forbids it. Trent Horn, for example, insists that “there is a punishment, so the child has some value and is not equivalent to disposable medical waste as he is in our legal system” (2014, p. 236). To be sure, that causing a woman to miscarry is certainly penalized in Exodus, and does indeed suggest the fetus has value. However, it should go without saying that not all penalties are equal and not all value is the same. To pick one example, people today are regularly fined for littering, yet surely Horn wouldn’t argue this equates to taking a human life. The point made by certain commentators is simply that because “life for life” isn’t required, the fetus isn’t regarded as valuable as a human life. That only a fine is required would place the fetus’ death on par with something more akin to a property crime, or at most a crime involving livestock (e.g., Exodus 21:33-34). But other critics, such as John and Paul Feinberg, evidently think it’s far worse than that, insisting the penalty “shows that the death of the unborn is an evil” (2010, p. 106). How exactly they’re defining “evil” here is unclear, but it’s worth noting that, as we discussed earlier, one way to translate verse 22 is “her child comes out and there is no evil.” Ironically then, the verse says just the opposite; the fetus’ death is not regarded as evil. Instead, taking the verse at face value, opponents of abortion should, at most, regard abortion today as no worse a crime than littering or property damage. (Of course, considering the rhetoric regularly voiced by such critics, it’s unlikely they will adopt such a view.)[35]

Another common objection is that there are places in Scripture where the death penalty is waved for killing someone, so long as the death is accidental (e.g., Feinberg & Feinberg, 2010, p. 106; Grudem, 2020, p. 17). It’s assumed then that verse 22 simply follows suit in this line of thought. Admittedly, this makes sense to a point. Yet when we take a closer look at the verses in question, we find caveats to these exceptions that only raise more questions than answers.

There are four sections of Scripture where accidental death is discussed, and where the death penalty is waved: Exodus 21:13-14, Numbers 35:10-34, Deuteronomy 19:1-13, and Exodus 21:20-21. The first three of these pertain to those who’ve accidentally killed, and rather than being subjected to the “life for life” penalty, they were instead required to live in a so-called “city of refuge.” In essence, this acted as a kind of ancient relocation safe house (or “safe city” in this case), where the killer was required to live until the death of the appointed high priest, in order to avoid potential retaliation. If they left the city, however, they could possibly be put to death. With all this in mind, the point about different penalties still appears problematic. Having to give up one’s livelihood and relocate to another city for an indefinite period of time, and forced to do so on pain of death, would seem to be a harsher penalty than merely paying a fine, yet that wasn’t the assailant’s punishment in Exodus 21:22. That killing a fetus evidently warranted a lesser penalty still suggests it wasn’t regarded as valuable as a full-grown person, contrary to what’s claimed otherwise.

Compounding the problem with the critics’ logic is that if death occurs in verse 22, then obviously it occurs in verse 23 as well. And not only is the assailant not subjected to relocation in verse 23, he’s actually given the death penalty! This is despite the fact that the death caused in verse 23 would be just as accidental as that described in verse 22. Clearly, something is wrong here. Fortunately, a closer look at the so-called “relocation” verses helps to clear up this confusion.

Note that in the relocation verses, both the act of killing and intention are emphasized as the deciding factors for the penalties imposed. It’s made clear the death penalty is waved only if the killer “did not lie in wait” for the person they killed (Exodus 21:13), that they did so “without malice aforethought” (Deuteronomy 19:4-6 [NIV]), and “without enmity” (Numbers 35:22). In other words, the verses emphasize that not only was the death accidental, but that the killer had no intention whatsoever of causing anyone harm. They even give specific examples, such as accidentally throwing or dropping something on someone (Numbers 35:22-23 [NIV]), or if while chopping wood, having the axe head fly off and hit somebody (Deuteronomy 19:5).

Contrast this with the situation we find in Exodus 21:22-25. We have at least two men fighting, obviously intending to harm and possibly even kill each other. During the fight, one of them lands a blow on a pregnant woman, causing her to miscarry and possibly die. So, while the victim might have been accidental, the intent was not. The assailant obviously intended to cause harm, and by doing so was still subjected to the same punishment as though he had harmed his intended victim. This is not at all unlike our current legal doctrine of “transferred intent,” wherein someone is charged with the same crime if they intend to harm a specific person, but ends up unintentionally hurting someone else. It’s entirely possible the ancient Israelites held this kind of mindset at the time they composed Exodus (Hensler, 2019, pp. 87-90).

The fourth verse in question, Exodus 21:20-21, is of special interest. Immediately preceding verse 22, verses 20-21 read as follows:

When a man strikes his slave, male or female, with a rod and the slave dies under his hand, he shall be punished. But if the slave survives a day or two, he is not to be punished; for the slave is his money.

Here we are told that if a slave owner beats his slave, and the slave dies immediately, the owner is given an unspecified punishment.[36] If, however, the slave dies a day or two later, the owner receives no punishment at all. That the slave dies after a couple days, rather than immediately, is apparently what implies the death was accidental.

The reason this verse is of special interest is because certain critics bizarrely believe it supports their position, rather than the one outlined here. John and Paul Feinberg, for example, insist that the different penalties described in the Exodus text “can hardly be explained in terms of personhood” (2010, p. 106), and their lone justification for this is Exodus 21:20-21. Yet it is difficult to understand how this in any way supports their view. The verse shows a clear case where one person kills another, and as long as it was accidental, the one who did it receives no punishment at all—no fine, no relocation, nothing. Lacking any evidence to the contrary, this certainly suggests, to my mind, that the slave was regarded as less valuable than any free person at least; that at most, they were considered no more valuable than livestock, whose death at least warranted monetary compensation.

Feinberg and Feinberg of course disagree, writing “Surely, no one today would say that penalty stems from the slave’s reduced or lack of personhood” (2010, p. 106). Frankly, I’m at a loss to understand how they conclude that, especially since the verse explicitly says why no penalty is imposed; because the slave is the owner’s “money” (chaspo, lit. “property”).[37] And money is a thing, not a person.[38] The owner receives no punishment for the slave’s death precisely because the death is the punishment; the loss of his “money” (Stark, 2011, p. 181). A similar penalty was imposed on owners whose oxen gored someone. If the one gored was a free person, the owner could be put to death. If the person gored was someone else’s slave, however, the owner only had to pay a fine (Exodus 21:28-32). As Peter Enns observes, “The clear implication is that the life of a free person is worth more than that of the servant” (2000, p. 448).

It should go without saying that if a full-grown adult’s life could be considered less valuable than a human’s, a fetus’ certainly could too. Even if we say this example is no definitive proof that the Bible reduced the personhood of certain humans, it appears indistinguishable from doing so. Likewise, that only a fine was required for killing a fetus is indistinguishable from saying the fetus was no more valuable than property or livestock.[39] To argue contrarily, better evidence is needed than what certain critics have presented.

2.3 The Abortion Debate Today

A final argument typically made by biblically-inclined pro-lifers is that even if the miscarriage interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 is correct, it has no bearing on the modern abortion debate anyway. For example, some argue that since the miscarriage described in verse 22 is accidental, and modern abortions are done to intentionally end a pregnancy, it’s inapplicable to determine what the Bible’s true feelings on intentional abortion might be. According to pastor Michele Hendrickson:

Even if this Mosaic Law was dealing with a situation where the child’s life was lost (which it wasn’t), this is not an apples-to-apples situation equal to abortion…. No matter how life is lost, it is tragic. However, intentionally killing someone is fundamentally different than accidentally killing someone and should be treated as such when consequences are applied. It was then, and it is now. Abortion intentionally and violently destroys human life. Exodus 21:22 does not deal with intentional destruction of a human fetus. (Hendrickson, 2021)

The problem with this logic, however, is that, as we discussed earlier, the Book of Exodus did not, in fact, make the distinction between accidental and deliberate killing in the absolutist way Hendrickson believes. Rather, as we’ve seen, so long as the intent was to cause harm, Exodus makes clear that death was warranted as the punishment for killing, whether an accident or not. Likewise, we could then perhaps infer this means that whether the pregnancy termination described in verse 22 was accidental or deliberate also wouldn’t matter—that it would warrant the same punishment regardless; i.e., a fine. And indeed, there is some non-biblical support for this notion. Recall that Philo and Josephus didn’t regard intent as a relevant factor when discussing Exodus 21:22. Instead, only if one “kicks” or “comes to blows” with a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry, the one who did it only pays a fine. No mention is made of intent, whether the strike is accidental, or that the assailant is fighting with another man.

Furthermore, we shouldn’t overlook the fact that the one who’s truly seen as wronged in this situation is the husband, not the woman who miscarries. It is, after all, he who receives compensation for the pregnancy loss, given that, according to Tracy Lemos “the fetus … has no apparent legal standing separate from its father” (2017, p. 140). As Michael Gorman observes, it’s possible the penalty outlined in verse 22 “was motivated by a patriarchal view of women and children as possessions of their husbands and fathers” (1996, p. 145). As we’ve touched on throughout this essay, this means the fetus, regarding its legal standing and the penalty imposed for killing it, would have been seen more as property, rather than a human being.

Consider that the same penalty, that of monetary compensation, was warranted if someone caused someone else’s livestock to die (Exodus 21:33-34, Leviticus 24:21), but there was no law that said a man couldn’t kill his own livestock. Similarly, while Exodus 21:22 makes it clear a third party had no right to kill another’s fetus, this may mean that a man had the right to kill a fetus, as long as it was biologically his. Of course, this means the woman ultimately had no say in whether she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. Yet if verse 22 stipulates that a fine was warranted for causing pregnancy loss, we could perhaps then infer that the woman could end her pregnancy, as long as she compensated her husband monetarily.[40]

Another detail often overlooked in this discussion is that while the induced miscarriage in verse 22 is indeed accidental, it’s also done by a third party, entirely without the consent of either the man or woman. How this is supposed to show that intentional abortion, carried out with the full consent of the man and woman is wrong, is unclear. Even today, laws are in place stipulating that if someone does something to kill a woman’s fetus in the womb, it’s a crime, but abortion done by a doctor, willfully sought out by a woman, is not (Pregnancy Justice, 2022). If verse 22 is anything to go by, it suggests that, at most, a third party has no right to violently terminate a woman’s pregnancy against her and her husband’s wishes, a rather uncontroversial sentiment to modern sensibilities.

To that end, we might ponder why the Bible only contains this lone prescription against accidental fetal destruction, but no outright prescription against intentional pregnancy termination. Meredith Kline, while acknowledging the Bible is silent on the issue of abortion legislation, suggests that “[i]t was so unthinkable that an Israelite woman should desire an abortion that there was no need to mention this offense in the criminal code” (1977, p. 193). Certainly that’s one possibility, but in light of the available data, not a particularly likely one. After all, it’s not as though abortion was unheard of at the time Exodus was composed. The Middle Assyrian Laws (ca. 1076 BCE), for example, contain one of the oldest regulations against intentional abortion, even dictating that a woman who did so was subjected to death by impalement (Roth, 1995, p. 174). Nothing like this is found anywhere in Scripture. Likewise, later Jewish texts, such as the Mishnah and the Talmud, discuss situations where abortions are permissible, including cases where the woman’s life is at risk (Irshai, 2023). One wonders why abortion was considered “unthinkable” at the time Exodus was composed, but not so hundreds of years earlier by the Assyrians, and hundreds of years later by Jewish authorities. And given the high maternal mortality rate in antiquity, the idea that an Israelite woman would never have considered ending her pregnancy is, at best, highly optimistic.[41] Instead, a more parsimonious explanation, suggested by Paul Simmons, is that the Bible’s lack of any such law indicates abortion in ancient Israel may have been “a private, personal, and religious matter not subject to civil regulation” (1990, p. 11).

Finally, some critics believe Exodus 21:22-25 can be dismissed from the modern abortion debate outright, simply because it’s a law found in the Old Testament. According to Hendrickson:

We can pick apart the Old Testament all day long, but Christians know that Christ came to fulfill the law (Matthew 5:17). He did not abolish the Law, He fulfilled it. That is another important distinction. The consequence of our sin nature [sic] is death. But the good news of the Gospel is that we no longer live by “an eye for an eye” as Jesus so beautifully teaches in his Sermon on the Mount. We couldn’t keep the law and earn our way to salvation if we tried. Hate for our brother is as condemnable as murder. Lust in our hearts is as sinful as adultery. We fall short every time. Jesus completed the requirements forever so that we are no longer bound to chasing perfection through following Mosaic Law. (Hendrickson, 2021)

This echoes the common mindset of most modern Christians—that the Mosaic Laws of the Old Testament have, in at least some respect, been abrogated by Jesus’ coming and fulfillment of the law, and subsequently the implementation of a new covenant. David Dorsey, for example, notes that the Mosaic Laws were written for a specific group of people (the Israelites), in a specific cultural setting, and thus are inapplicable today. More specifically, he notes that the laws were meant to “regulate the lives of people in the distinctive geographical and climatic conditions found in the southern Levant, and many of the regulations are inapplicable, unintelligible, or even nonsensical outside that regime” (Dorsey, 1991, p. 325).

However, does this mean the Mosaic Laws are abandoned entirely? Many Christians believe not, instead granting that while the laws as written may not be applicable today, certain moral and even legal guidelines can still be inferred from them and applied to modern society. (Sprinkle, 2008, p. 920) Dorsey offers several suggestions to Christians on how they should approach individual Mosaic Laws, one of which is particularly enlightening:

A law, as mentioned, reveals a great deal about the lawgiver. What does this law reflect about God’s mind, his personality, his qualities, attitudes, priorities, values, concerns, likes and dislikes, his teaching methodologies, the kinds of attitudes and moral and ethical standards he wants to see in those who love him? In spite of the fact that these 613 laws were issued to another people who lived at another time under very different circumstances than our own …, they come from the God whom we too serve, and they represent a vast reservoir of knowledge about him and his ways. (Dorsey, 1991, p. 333)

John and Paul Feinberg offer similar sentiments, writing that the laws of the OT “can be very instructive in setting forth God’s underlying attitude toward an ethical issue,” and that “appeal to the OT may give a fuller explanation of a moral principle and God’s reasoning for it than one finds in the NT.” Interestingly, they apply these notions to Exodus 21:22-25 as an example. Though acknowledging that nothing is said of Exodus 21:22-25’s regulations in the NT, they nonetheless grant that the passage “is relevant for determining God’s attitude toward the unborn” because “nothing in the NT suggests that God’s attitude toward the unborn has changed” (Feinberg & Feinberg, 2010, p. 48).

Of course they, like John Piper and other critics, mistakenly believe Exodus 21:22 refers to a premature birth, rather than a miscarriage, and thus believe the verse speaks to the humanity of the unborn. As we’ve explored here, this position is untenable. Yet their secondary point remains a good one. Nothing in the NT does suggest God’s feelings about the unborn have changed from the OT. Only God’s specific laws have been abrogated, but not his personal feelings. Thus, if God viewed the unborn as no more valuable than property in the OT, it follows that this is how he feels in the NT as well. Unless they or anyone else can show evidence to the contrary, the dismissal of the OT laws is insufficient to prove God sees the unborn as fully human, and thus worthy of protection from abortion.

Conclusion, and Why This all Matters

The main goal of this essay was to provide an overview of the reasons why the miscarriage interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 is indeed correct, and why the minority interpretation of premature birth is groundless. We conclude this goal has been met. The vast majority of scholars reject the premature birth view, and the evidence we’ve discussed herein more than explains why. A careful exegesis of Scripture, combined with considerations of various extent commentaries and the background context of the Ancient Near East, shows that the act killing a pregnant woman’s fetus only incurred a fine, while the killing of a valid human person warranted life for life. We have also considered various other claims raised by critics who argue the miscarriage interpretation, even if correct, has no bearing on the modern abortion debate. We conclude these arguments fail as well.

In light of these conclusions, the question we must then ask is, where do we go from here? Unfortunately, this may be a harder question to settle than the exegesis we’ve engaged in. The purpose of this article has not necessarily been to prove the Bible permits abortion, but merely to provide a clearer understanding of what Scripture says with regard to the unborn and how the biblical god views them. In turn, the hope is that those whose pro-life position is derived from the Bible might consider this discussion and reevaluate their stance, now armed with better information. As we noted earlier, opposition to unborn termination based on religious grounds is prominent in the U.S., and since Roe‘s reversal will likely only intensify.[42] Accordingly, it’s perhaps more important now than ever to have an accurate understanding of what Scripture really says about the unborn, if such considerations will continue to influence public perceptions.

While circumstances beyond my control necessitate it, it bears emphasizing that I would, in fact, rather not devote any serious discussion to what the Bible may or may not say about abortion, as it’s largely irrelevant in the grand scheme of things. Discussing abortion on theological grounds is merely one avenue of inquiry, and does not even consider the broader array of subjects—that of science, ethics, and philosophy—that have been explored elsewhere at length and are far more relevant to the debate.[43] Even setting aside ethical disputes, the data consistently bears out that abortion is a valid, safe form of reproductive healthcare, necessary for millions of people across the country (National Academies, 2018; Kapp & Lohr, 2020). That access to this is threatened by religious convictions, which are notoriously riddled with ambiguities and imprecise talk of morality, is regrettable, and unfortunately makes a serious discussion needed, if for no other reason than to try and clear up such ambiguities and imprecise talk.

The irony of all this is that, despite such incessant opposition, all parties agree that the Bible says nothing directly about abortion, one way or the other. Yet this hasn’t stopped abortion opponents from extrapolating from Scripture a pro-life outlook, a position perhaps best summarized by the late Pope John Paul II:

The texts of Sacred Scripture never address the question of deliberate abortion and so do not directly and specifically condemn it. But they show such great respect for the human being in the mother’s womb that they require as a logical consequence that God’s commandment “You shall not kill” be extended to the unborn child as well. (Pope John Paul II, 1995)

Yet our contention is that the Bible is not as “respectful” towards the unborn as the late Pope believed.[44] And while a pro-life stance can certainly be read into Scripture, our discussion suggests that reading a pro-choice position into it is hardly out of the question.[45]

If no definite answer can be settled about the Bible’s stance on abortion, then what this discussion warrants more than anything is for those on all sides of the debate to err on the side of caution when considering Scripture. Whether the Bible objects to fetal termination is not a simple “yes/no” question as some might believe, and in my opinion, a humbler mindset is warranted if one is to base their stance on abortion on what the Bible says. In closing, I respectfully make only one request to those interested parties (especially those in positions of governmental power): Please adopt this mindset too.

Appendix A: Other Verses

In this appendix, we will consider other verses that have been cited as evidence to show the Bible considers the unborn human persons at every stage of development, including at conception.[46] Note that this is a limited discussion, and that is very much intentional. Due to the sheer size of the Bible and the vast number of verses throughout, it is simply not possible to address every potential verse that might be cited in support of fetal personhood, especially if certain critics apply an unexpected interpretation to any of them. Therefore, rather than a comprehensive review, this should be read as both a critique and a general guide for how to approach individual verses that may be cited in support of fetal personhood.

Exodus 20:13: For some, the Sixth Commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill” is all the justification one needs to object to abortion on biblical grounds. The logic goes that since this verse applies to humans, and the unborn are technically human, this commandment applies to them as well. As we saw above, this was the logic employed by the late Pope John Paul II.

I’ve previously addressed this particular verse, and the various pro-life arguments associated with it, in a separate article (Taylor, 2024). Among other problems[47], one of the most significant is that the argument itself begs the question, assuming that the Bible views the unborn as valid human persons, and thus categorically fall under the Sixth Commandment’s protection. In other words, the argument assumes the very premise it sets out to prove. Before Exodus 20:13 can be used to object to abortion, one would first need to prove the Bible actually considers the unborn human persons at every stage of development.[48] As we’ve seen, the implications of Exodus 21:22 suggest just the opposite.

Psalm 139:13-16: According to Paul Copan, Psalm 139 “strongly supports the value of the unborn” (2011, p. 99), and he cites it specifically as evidence to counter the implications of Exodus 21:22-25. The relevant verses in question read:

For thou didst form my inward parts,
thou didst knit me together in my mother’s womb.
I praise thee, for thou art fearful and wonderful.
Wonderful are thy works!
Thou knowest me right well;
my frame was not hidden from thee,
when I was being made in secret,
intricately wrought in the depths of the earth.
Thy eyes beheld my unformed substance;
in thy book were written, every one of them,
the days that were formed for me,
when as yet there was none of them.

We previously touched on the Psalms in our discussion of John Piper. As noted earlier, the problem with citing any of the Psalms is that their poetic nature makes any literal interpretation inconclusive without further justification. Ironically, Copan is well aware of this, since he’s previously argued the so-called “imprecatory psalms” should not be regarded as entirely literal. For example, discussing Psalm 137:8-9‘s apparent joy at dashing babies against rocks, Copan cites Old Testament scholar John Sailhamer’s observation that the imagery of Psalm 137 “is no more intended to be taken literally” than the Psalms which speak of “rivers clapping their hands and mountains singing for joy” (Copan, 2008). Yet why should we assume the Psalmist’s description of God “forming his inward parts” and “knitting him together in the womb” should be regarded as any more literal? Copan never says.

Moreover, if Psalm 139 is to be interpreted literally, this comes with unfortunate drawbacks. As Paul Simmons notes, the Psalmist’s reference to his “frame” being “wrought in the depths of the earth” (Psalm 139:15) implies the fetus is first made in the earth, and then placed in the womb. Furthermore, he notes these verses may reflect the Aristotelian view of conception—that only man’s sperm was the complete seed from which humans are born, with the womb acting merely as the incubator to grow the seed (Simmons, 1990, p. 5). According to Andrew Lincoln “Scriptural texts share the dominant Aristotelian view of how conception occurs” (Lincoln, 2014), citing other examples such as Job 10:8-12 and 31:15. It’s safe to assume Copan likely won’t accept these interpretations, in light of what we know from modern biology.

I’ll reiterate the point made earlier regarding the Psalms; that citing them in any literal capacity requires far more exegetical justification than just quoting them verbatim. Copan has shown he understands this concept, and so should be far more cautious when citing them to justify his position that the Bible values the unborn as much as birthed humans, especially in light of Exodus 21:22-25. That he juxtaposes poetic, nonliteral Psalms against the very literal, legal prescriptions set forth in Exodus is, in my opinion, rather sloppy hermeneutics.[49]

Psalm 51:5: While also unpersuaded by Psalm 139, Trent Horn nonetheless believes evidence for fetal personhood can be found elsewhere in the Psalms. Specifically, he points to Psalm 51:5, where the Psalmist declares he was “brought forth in iniquity,” and was conceived in sin. This, he believes, “make[s] a strong case that the unborn have a personal existence before birth,” and then rhetorically asks how the Psalmist could “be a sinner in the womb if he was not yet a person?” (Horn, 2014, p. 237) Wayne Grudem agrees, writing that the Psalmist “[says] that from the moment of his conception he has had a sinful nature. This means that he thinks of himself as having been a distinct human being, a distinct person, from the moment of his conception” (Grudem, 2020, p. 13).

Frankly, this is a confusing line of thought. How does it follow that since the Psalmist was imbued with sin at conception, that entails he was a sinner in any personal sense at that point? It would be a bit like saying that if someone genetically inherited HIV in the womb, it would be appropriate to call them an “HIV spreader” before birth. Furthermore, like Psalm 139, it is unclear whether the Psalmist is speaking literally. Elsewhere, he declares people are “wicked” and “go astray from the womb,” and that at birth they “speak lies” (Psalm 58:3). It should be clear that the author is speaking hyperbolically, since newborns obviously cannot tell lies. Moreover, scholars dispute whether Psalm 51:5 actually teaches that humans are imbued with sin at conception, rather than it being a general confession of the Psalmist’s penitence.[50] After all, Psalm 139, also cited in support of fetal personhood, seems to contradict this, declaring that the Psalmist was “wonderfully” made in his mother’s womb. Would it really be “wonderful” for him to have been created with sin?

At the risk of repetition, I will again reiterate that the highly poetic, nonliteral nature of the Psalms in general makes any literal interpretation inconclusive. Ironically, this is the very reason Trent Horn finds Psalm 139 unpersuasive, since “pro-choice critics are likely to reject passages from the Psalms as being poetic exaggerations” (Horn, 2014, p. 237). Yet he goes on to cite Psalm 51:5, without ever justifying why it too isn’t merely a “poetic exaggeration.” If nothing else, Horn’s discussion serves to further highlight the rather inconsistent standards by which certain pro-life advocates employ their hermeneutics. Authors such as Horn and Grudem would do well to heed the words of Kira Schlesinger, who aptly observes that “Quoting the psalms literally rather than reading or praying them as the hymnbook and prayer book of ancient Israel does a great disservice to the psalms themselves and how we interpret Scripture” (Schlesinger, 2017, p. 57).

Jeremiah 1:4-5: Perhaps the most popular verse cited, Jeremiah 1:4-5 has been a mainstay of the Christian pro-life movement’s crusade to prove the Bible regards the unborn as fully persons. According to Michele Hendrickson Jeremiah 1 “tells us that we are unique, and God sets in motion His individual calling for us even before we are born” (Hendrickson, 2023). The verse reads:

Now the word of the Lord came to me saying, “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations.”

There are several problems with Hendrickson’s line of thought, however. First, that she applies this verse to “us,” meaning all of humanity, is a gross overstatement. Like Psalm 139, Jeremiah 1:4-5 concerns only a single individual—the prophet Jeremiah in this case. He’s clearly speaking only of himself, with no indication whatsoever that this “call” applies to humans in general. Second, her description of the verse is slightly incorrect, as it clearly says God knew Jeremiah before he formed him in the womb. The word for “formed” used here is yatsar, the same word used in Genesis 2:7 to describe God’s creation of Adam. In other words, Jeremiah 1:5 implies God knew Jeremiah before he was conceived, not just before his birth. The problem, as Michael Gorman points out, is that if this is taken literally, “isn’t one forced to say that personhood begins before conception, ‘before I formed you in the womb’?” (Gorman, 1996, p. 147) If one wishes to argue that life does, in fact, begin even before conception, they are certainly welcome to do so. But such a notion is rarely, if ever, heard amongst the pro-life movement.[51]

Additionally, there is relevant context outside of the Bible that Hendrickson and other critics fail to consider. Namely, that declarations of divine election from the womb are found in other Near Eastern legends predating the Old Testament, such as those from Egypt and Mesopotamia (Walton, Matthews, & Chavalas, 2000, pp. 642-643). In the Bible itself, such declarations are also made of the prophet Isaiah (Isaiah 49:1, 5). That the author of Jeremiah added the extra twist that he was known not just before birth, but even before conception, suggests that this verse was meant to, in the words of Dan McClellan, “rhetorically amplify Jeremiah’s prophetic authority by insisting that—in contrast to other prophets called in adulthood—his consecration as a prophet preceded even his conception and birth” (2025, p. 95). In other words, the author of Jeremiah appears to be engaging in a kind of prophetic one-upmanship—boasting of his importance by saying that, unlike prophets before him, he was known and called by God even before he was conceived in the womb.

Taking this all into consideration, what Jeremiah 1:4-5 likely speaks to is not fetal personhood, but rather God’s divine foreknowledge—that he knew who Jeremiah would become, and had plans for him in the future. (Indeed, according to Jeremiah 29:11, plans for the future are exactly what God has in mind for him.) Even beyond Scriptural considerations, Christians today routinely insist one of God’s divine attributes is omniscience, which includes his knowledge of the future. Thus, from his perspective there would be no way for him to think of the unborn without knowing who they would become after birth.[52] Without a more definite Scriptural declaration that those in the womb are considered true human persons, the citation of Jeremiah 1:4-5 is, at best, inconclusive.

Luke 1:41-44: Moving on to the New Testament, Wayne Grudem cites Luke 1:41-44 as evidence that “an unborn child should be thought of and protected as a person from the moment of conception” (2020, p. 11). The verse in question concerns Mary visiting Elizabeth, the mother of John the Baptist, during her pregnancy. The relevant section reads:

And when Elizabeth heard the greeting of Mary, the babe leaped in her womb; and Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit and she exclaimed with a loud cry, “Blessed are you among women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb! And why is this granted me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me? For behold, when the voice of your greeting came to my ears, the babe in my womb leaped for joy.”

That the unborn John the Baptist “leaped” in Elizabeth’s womb (even “for joy”), and is referred to as a “babe” is evidently what’s supposed to indicate he was fully a person before his birth. But the arguments for this are not particularly convincing.

As Joel Hoffman observes, linguistically the verse is inconclusive, since “words can generally be separated from the time at which they apply.” He further explains:

This is why “the founding father as a child” means “the person who will be the founding father.” It’s why we can talk of “two-year-old Mark Twain” even though when he was only two, he was still called Samuel Clemens, not yet having assumed his pen name. It’s why a teacher might meet a former student and exclaim, “Look at my student, all grown-up now.” It’s why a woman, even before she’s pregnant, might say she’s already thinking about her children. And it’s why the words “mother” and “child” in connection to a woman carrying a fetus are (perhaps) a linguistic curiosity, but they do not tell us what the Bible says about the nature of that fetus. (Hoffman, 2016, p. 268)

Grudem also makes much of the fact that the word brephos is used to describe the fetus, since “[t]his is the same Greek word that is used for a child after it is born, as when Jesus is called a ‘baby [brephos] lying in a manger'” (2020, pp. 11-12). That, and the fact that the fetus moved allegedly at the sound of Mary’s greeting, suggests fetal personhood in Grudem’s mind. Michael Gorman notes the logic of these arguments “might be compelling, if they did not rest on erroneous assumptions about language.” He elaborates:

The normal use of a common word like “baby” or “infant” does not necessarily reveal anything about one’s philosophical or moral convictions. Neither does attributing activity to a fetus. For instance, it is just as possible for a prochoice woman as for a pro-life woman, seven months into a pregnancy, to say, “I just felt the baby kicking.” Such a statement does not reveal either woman’s view of the true “status” of the fetus, nor does it reveal either woman’s position on abortion. The “pro-life” interpretation of these texts places more weight on a few words than they can bear. (Gorman, 1996, pp. 146-147)

As Richard Carrier more succinctly puts it, “that the word brephos in Greek meant both babies and fetuses tells us nothing about their being the same in every respect, much less respects pertinent to laws about murder, any more than including humans and cows in the word ‘mammal’ means cows are humans” (Carrier, 2020). In short, the language used in the verse is hardly conclusive, and relies more on leaps in logic than sound linguistic analysis.

Furthermore, even were we to accept the verse at face value, with no deeper exegetical considerations, it still wouldn’t prove the Bible considers the unborn persons at every stage of development, nor that all abortions should be banned. Note that Luke 1:41-44 is the only place in the New Testament where brephos is used to describe a fetus, and as Grudem correctly notes, Elizabeth was in her sixth month of pregnancy when this occurred, or roughly around 24 weeks. As we discussed earlier, this is the same figure originally established by Roe v. Wade as the viability cut-off point for elective abortions, and also when many pro-choice advocates and the medical community at large agree abortions shouldn’t be carried out (unless needed to protect a woman’s life or health). Likewise, as we also previously noted, the Septuagint reading of Exodus 21:22-25 regards fetal termination a capital crime only if done after the fetus is “fully formed,” which may refer to anywhere from 40 to 90 days, or 16 to 22 weeks. Since the six-month timeframe of Elizabeth’s pregnancy exceeds this, Luke 1:41-44 could, at most, offer biblical support for banning abortions after such time, but not before.

Ultimately, nothing about the verse justifies banning abortion “from the moment of conception,” as Grudem insists. Neither the language used nor the alleged activity of the fetus[53] described therein suggests the Bible considers fetuses persons at every stage of development. And even accepting the verse at face value, it may in fact be consistent with modern mainstream views on abortion, and Exodus 21’s stipulations about when fetuses can truly be regarded as persons.

Galatians 1:15: Similar to Jeremiah 1:4-5, Galatians 1:15 is sometimes cited in support of fetal personhood (e.g., Fuller, 1994, p. 178), since it speaks of Paul being “called” and “set apart” in the womb before he was born. Yet it also possesses problems similar to that of the Jeremiah text. For starters, like Jeremiah 1:4-5, the text suggests, at most, that God possessed knowledge of who Paul would become, and that he had plans for him in the future. Furthermore, like Jeremiah 1 and Psalms 51 and 139, the Galatians verse concerns only a single person, namely Paul in this case, with no mention of this “call” applying to all of humanity. As Margaret Kamitsuka observes, “I see nothing in Paul’s writings indicating that he thought all fetuses were called by God merely because he believed he had been” (2019, p. 67). Furthermore, there is even circumstantial evidence suggesting that Paul did not believe all fetuses were made in the imago Dei (image of God), excluding them from the category of persons.[54]

Again, these are only some of the likely many verses that have been cited in support of biblical fetal personhood. Yet they represent some of the most popular examples cited, and as we can see, they far from demonstrate the Bible sees the unborn truly as persons, and certainly not to the extent of overriding the implications of Exodus 21:22-25. What also becomes apparent is that the verses most often cited tend to be largely poetic and figurative in nature, not literal legal declarations as in the Book of Exodus. Furthermore, we see these verses focus on specific individuals, not humanity as a whole, and only speak of plans God has for them in the future, after they’re born. To conclude that what the biblical god deemed true of these specific people holds true for all humans, including while in the womb, is a leap in logic, and requires far more exegetical justification. Modern Christians who’ve cited these verses would do well to consider the words of earlier Christian authorities, such as Thomas Aquinas, who observed that we are “[not] to believe that any others, not mentioned by Scripture, were sanctified in the womb” (1247/1947), III Q.27, a.6).

Fortunately, some modern-day Christians do appear to understand this, such as Greg Koukl, who offers this succinct observation of the types of verses we’ve discussed here:

Most attempts to argue against abortion from biblical texts are misdirected. In the absence of specific prohibitions of abortion in the Scripture, Christian pro-lifers quote equivocal passages.

Some citations use personal pronouns to describe the unborn, but many of these are in poetry texts, so the conclusion is not entirely convincing. God’s personal acquaintance with the unborn can be explained by His omniscience. After all, some texts make it clear that God “knows” us even before we’re conceived. (Koukl, 2013)

One hopes more Christians will adopt this mindset, if we are to make real progress in understanding how the Bible truly sees the unborn.

Notes

[1] Unless noted otherwise, all scripture quotations are from the Revised Standard Version (RSV) of the Bible, copyright ©1946, 1952, and 1971 the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.

[2] Other examples of the “lex talionis” principle include Leviticus 24:17-22 and Deuteronomy 19:15-21. Some have suggested that this principle was only figurative, rather than literal, but this is unlikely (Stark, 2011, pp. 41-47).

[3] For examples of miscarriage, see the AMPC, CEB, CJB, CEV, NABRE, NCB, NLV, NRSV, and RSV. For examples suggesting premature birth, see the ASV, AMP, ESV, ISV, MEV, NASB, NET, NIV, and NKJV.

[4] Adventist scholar Ron du Preez, who otherwise rejects the miscarriage interpretation, writes: “A careful analysis of all available English language reference works makes it evident that most commentators believe that Exodus 21:22-25 deals with a miscarried fetus, i.e., a stillborn child” (1990, p. 7). Other scholars have acknowledged this consensus view as well (e.g., Simmons, 1990, p. 3; Gorman, 1996, p. 150; Hoffman, 2016, p. 266; McClellan, 2024). In a similar vein, Douglas Stuart notes that the NIV translation of verse 22 (“and she gives birth prematurely”), which Piper endorses, “has not been accepted by most subsequent versions and commentators” (2006, p. 491).

[5] Alter (2004, pp. 439-440), Anderson (2004, p. 36), Avalos (2007), Cahill (1995), Carrier (2020), Collins (2020), Dolansky (2023), Ehrman (2024), Enns (2000, pp. 446-447), Friedman & Dolansky (2011, pp. 44-46), Fuller (1994, pp. 180-184), Garber (2021, p. 203), Gericke (2003, p. 207), Harvey (2023), Hoffman (2016, pp. 265-266), Irshai (2012, pp. 117-118), Janzen (1997, p. 163), Kamitsuka (2019, p. 207), Kim (2006, p. 8), Langston (2005, p. 190), Lemos (2017, p. 170), McClellan (2025, pp. 98-101), McDaniel (2012), Otto (1993, p. 15), Paul (2005, p. 71), Peerbolte (2016, pp. 53-55), Schiff (2002, pp. 28-29), Simmons (1990, pp. 2-3), Sprinkle (1993, pp. 248-252), Tigay (2014, p. 154), Walton, Matthews, & Chavalas (2000, p. 99), Ward (1986), White (2016, pp. 201-202), Wilson-Kastner & Blair (1985), Wright (2009, pp. 176-177). For an expanded list of such scholars, see the webpage “Full List of Scholars on the Miscarriage in Exodus 21:22-25.”

[6] For example: Archer (1982, pp. 247-248), Feinberg & Feinberg (2010, pp. 106-108), Copan (2011, pp. 99-100), and Grudem (2020, pp. 14-18).

[7] Note that Luke Wayne translates Philo’s words as “and she gives birth” (Wayne, 2016). However, this is incorrect, as the original Greek reads ή δέ άμβλωση, which means “and she miscarries” (Colson, 1937/1998, p. 545, cf. p. 544).

[8] Flavius Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews 4.278; Onkelos Exodus 21:22; Mekhilta Tractate Nezikin 8:1; Bava Kamma 42a.

[9] Translations of the LL, SLEx, and LH are taken from Roth (1995, pp. 26-27, 43, 122).

[10] One might be tempted to cite Exodus 21:18-19, where compensation is required for causing bodily harm to another, but a comparison with that to Exodus 21:22-25 would come up short. As those verses make clear, the restitution made is for the injured man’s time lost while confined to a bed, and to see that his injuries are healed. If Exodus 21:22 describes a premature birth, as Piper insists, then none of this applies, since there’s obviously no time lost, and verse 22 specifically says there’s “no harm.”

[11] The translation from the original Hebrew is most accurately rendered: “And if men fight, and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she gives birth prematurely, and yet no harm follows, surely he shall be punished accordingly as the husband of the woman imposes on him, and he shall pay as the judges [determine]; but if harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.”

[12] For example, in Genesis 27:45, 42:36, 43:14, Leviticus 26:22, Deuteronomy 32:25, Isaiah 49:21, Jeremiah 15:7, Lamentations 1:20, Ezekiel 5:17, 36:12, 36:13, and Hosea 9:12.

[13] It’s worth noting, however, that the Septuagint identifies the dead infant as an ektróma, the same word that Paul uses in 1 Corinthians 15:8 to refer to himself as “one untimely born,” i.e., a miscarriage/abortion (Gieniusz, 2013). Likewise, the word was closely related to terms in medical writings referring to therapeutic abortions, abortions needed in situations to save a woman’s life (Hollander & van der Hout, 1996, p. 227).

[14] See also Job 3:11.

[15] Conversely, du Preez argues that neither Numbers 12:12 nor Job 3:11 can be used as evidence for a miscarriage occurring in Exodus 21:22, for the former verses contain yatsa in conjunction with muth (“to die”), which is absent from Exodus 21:22 (de Preez, 1990, pp. 14-15). However, like Piper, du Preez overlooks the use of nagaph in verse 22, which we noted earlier was always used in reference to lethal harm (Nagasawa, 2022b). Thus it is nagaph that provides the context of death occurring in verse 22, and nagaph could be used to denote death without the use of muth (e.g., Exodus 32:35 [cf. 32:28]; Numbers 14:42–43; Deuteronomy 28:7, 25–26).

[16] Some claim that the word means “fetus” (e.g., Feinberg & Feinberg, 2010, p. 107; Copan, 2011, p. 100). However, to the best of my knowledge, only two Bibles translate it as such (the NOG and God’s Word translation). The vast majority of Bibles translate the word either as “embryo” or “unformed substance.”

[17] Curiously, this particular plural of yeled is used only one other time, and is in reference to children who have died (Ruth 1:5).

[18] Some have suggested that the strike actually kills the woman but that the fetus comes out alive in verse 22, a scenario that Robert Congdon calls “medically nonsensical” (Congdon, 1989, p. 141).

[19] Indeed, other translations, including the updated editions of the NAB and NRSV, use “further” in verse 22.

[20] There is another (albeit tentative) explanation for the Hebrew lah‘s absence in verse 22. As discussed in section 2.1, the correct reading of Exodus 21:22-25 may indeed be the Septuagint translation, and the Hebrew Masoretic Text might be conveying the same idea, only worded differently (cf. McDaniel, 2012; Carrier, 2020). If so, the lack of language specifying harm to the woman might be because she is not in view at all. Rather, only damage to the fetus is in view, whether it’s “not fully formed” in verse 22, or “fully formed” in verse 23.

[21] According to Russell Fuller “in all Biblical and ancient Near Eastern legal literature and in almost all the general literature there are no references to premature births” (1994, p. 183).

[22] For other critiques of the premature birth interpretation, see Nagasawa (2022a) and McClellan (2024; 2025, pp. 99-101).

[23] The issue of abortion, and opposition to it based on religious grounds, certainly meets this criterion—see Boston (1993, pp. 173-175).

[24] LXX here refers to the Roman numeral for “70,” so named because tradition holds that about seventy translators worked independently to translate the Hebrew Bible into Greek.

[25] See Onkelos Exodus 21:22 and Bava Kamma 42a.

[26] Additionally, it’s worth noting that the LXX translation of Exodus 21:22-25 lacks the Aristotelian vocabulary typically used in Greek philosophy to denote something being “formed” (Jones, 2004, p. 49).

[27] Interestingly, this also corresponds to the views of certain pro-life politicians who, in recent years, have called for abortion to be banned after the sixteenth week of pregnancy (Haberman, Swan, & Lerer, 2024).

[28] Jane Roe, et al., Appellants, v. Henry Wade (1973), § 92.

[29] According to the AMA, “abortions [should] not be performed in the third trimester except in cases of serious fetal anomalies incompatible with life” (Fryhofer, 2022, p. 31). Likewise, the ACOG “is opposed to abortion of the healthy fetus that has attained viability in a healthy woman” (ACOG, 2011, p. 2).

[30] For example, deCarle (2024), Derin (2022), Johnson (2019, pp. 147-148), Whittenberger (2018), Lagercrantz (2014), Penner & Hull (2008), and Carrier (2000).

[31] ACOG (n.d.). See also Falsaperla et al. (2022) and Johnson (2019, p. 134n29).

[32] “Late-term abortion” is neither a clinically nor medically recognized phrase (ACOG, 2024). Rather, it is typically used only in a colloquial sense to refer to abortions done after 21 weeks, or close to the onset of the third trimester (Gomez, Salganicoff, & Sobel, 2024). This is how I’ve chosen to use the term here.

[33] For example, in Niddah 3:5 and Oholot 7:5-6. See also Schiff (2002, pp. 27-57).

[34] One could quibble that fetuses breath before birth, but this would be misleading. Fetuses don’t truly “breath” in the womb; instead, the umbilical cord provides oxygen until after the fetus is born and able to breath outside the womb on its own (Villines, 2023). For a scientific explanation of this process, see Hillman, Kallapur, & Jobe (2012).

[35] A few choice examples include: “God will require his [an embryo’s] blood at the hands of his murderer, whether the abortionist be a medical doctor or a nonprofessional” (Archer, 1982, p. 247); “[T]he mother is guilty of evil even if she donates the baby’s tissue and/or organs. She is the one who sanctioned the evil act of abortion” (Feinberg & Feinberg, 2010, p. 152); “[The United States] has willingly chosen to be represented and governed by elected officials who resolutely champion the right of a woman to take the life of her unborn child” (Grudem, 2020, p. 43); and “Abortion intentionally and violently destroys human life” (Hendrickson, 2021).

[36] Some believe that the punishment that the owner receives is death, but considering the specific language used here, this is unlikely (Avalos, 2011, p. 80). In addition, even if the death penalty were warranted, it may have applied only to the killing of Israelite slaves, not foreign ones (Wright, 2009, pp. 175-176).

[37] Likewise, Leviticus 25:44-46 explicitly identifies slaves from foreign nations as “property” (achuzzah).

[38] Avalos (2011, pp. 80-81) and Stark (2011, pp. 180-183) head off attempts to argue that this verse should be regarded as figurative rather than literal.

[39] With regard to fetuses and slaves as examples, Dan McClellan suggests that the Bible’s framework of personhood is best understood as “a continuum, or spectrum, of personhood running from ‘person’ to ‘property,’ where a specific degree of personhood is required for the killing of an individual to be considered murder” (2025, p. 98). Given that there was a standardized amount paid for the killing of slaves (thirty shekels per Exodus 21:32), but no standardized amount for killing a fetus, McClellan believes that this indicates that “a fetus occupied a position on the spectrum of personhood even closer to ‘property’ than an enslaved person.” In a similar vein, Daniel Schiff notes that since the Bible never calls a fetus a nefesh (person), adam (human), or ish (man), a fetus was “without any legal standing as a ‘person’,” and therefore “the category of murder was altogether inapplicable” (2002, p. 28).

[40] Indeed, Josephus notes that whether done by an assailant or the woman, terminating a pregnancy resulted in the same crime (reducing the population), suggesting that they both may have been subjected to the same punishment. See Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews 4.278 and Against Apion 2.202.

[41] Statistics regarding maternal mortality in antiquity are notoriously uncertain. Nonetheless, demographic data suggests that it was significantly higher than it is today. For example, evidence from ancient Greece suggests around 1 in 3 women died from complications related to childbirth (Woods, 2007). Likewise, examinations of female mummies from precivilized populations suggest that anywhere from 1 in 4 to 1 in 7 women died from childbirth complications, and not until around 600 CE did the rate drop to around 1 in 20 (Arriaza, Allison, & Gerszten, 1988).

[42] One noteworthy example occurred in early 2024, where the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the death of frozen embryos could legally be considered the death of children. In his official determination the chief justice made no secret of what influenced his ruling: “Human life cannot be wrongfully destroyed without incurring the wrath of a holy God. Even before birth, all human beings have the image of God, and their lives cannot be destroyed without effacing his glory” (Rojas, 2024).

[43] For example, deCarle (2024), Derin (2022), Johnson (2019), Whittenberger (2018), Lindsay (2014, pp. 235-240), and Carrier (2000).

[44] The late Pope’s words are especially ironic considering that the Latin Vulgate, the official translation of the Catholic Church, also affirms that the penalty for killing a fetus is only a fine, and not “life for life.”

[45] The group “Catholics for Choice,” for example, cites Exodus 21:22-25 specifically as evidence that the Bible doesn’t regard abortion as murder, and therefore could support a Christian pro-choice position.

[46] Of course, I am hardly the first to do this. See also McClellan (2025, pp. 94-96), Kamitsuka (2019, pp. 49-69), Schlesinger (2017, pp. 55-66), Gorman (1996, pp. 143-50), Simmons (1990), and Ward (1986).

[47] As explained in Taylor (2024), another problem is that, even if the Bible did consider the unborn human to be a person, that fact still wouldn’t justify banning all abortions. Scripture teaches that there are situations in which taking another’s life is allowable, such as self-defense (e.g., Exodus 22:2). As even some pro-life Christians acknowledge, certain abortions could qualify as self-defense, such as those needed to save the life of the one who’s pregnant (e.g., Archer, 1982, p. 248; Copan, 2011, p. 49; Grudem, 2020, pp. 29-30).

[48] A similar point can be made for verses such as Proverbs 6:16-17, which say that God hates “hands that shed innocent blood.” In order to use this to ground one’s opposition to abortion, one would first need to show that the Bible considers killing a fetus to constitute “shedding innocent blood.”

[49] It should be noted that Copan’s entire discussion of Exodus 21:22-25 is riddled with errors similar to those made by John Piper. Like Piper, he argues that Exodus 21:22 describes a premature birth, not a miscarriage, a position that we’ve explored at length and shown to be groundless. By far the most egregious error is his claim that yalad (the word for “birth”) is used not only in Exodus 21:22, but also in verses such as Genesis 25:26; 38:28-30, Job 3:11; 10:18, and Jeremiah 1:5; 20:18 (Copan, 2011, p. 100). However, with the exception of Genesis 38:28, yalad is not used in these verses. Instead, as established earlier, the word yatsa is used, which more generically just means “coming out” or “going forth.” Being generous, however, we can assume that this was simply a typo on Copan’s part.

[50] According to John Walton, Victor Matthews, and Mark Chavals, “[a]lthough [Psalm 51:5] has been used by some commentators to bolster the doctrine of ‘original sin,’ it seems a more appropriate interpretation to see it as part of the general confession of the penitent. In Mesopotamian incantations the sentiment is expressed that there is no one who has not sinned—everyone who exists is sinful. An admonition to confess the sinfulness of the human state appears in the Egyptian teachings of Amenemope, ‘Say not: ‘I have no wrongdoing.” The Israelites would have agreed with that theology in that they would have acknowledged a general inclination to sin that was characteristic of all people. They did not go the next step of Christian theology by seeing Adam’s sin imputed to people” (2000, p. 532).

[51] An additional problem with this view, noted by Margaret Kamitsuka, is that the notion of preexistence before conception would logically entail banning even the use of contraceptives and family planning, “since one might inadvertently thwart a predestined preexistent soul from being conceived” (2019, p. 67n77).

[52] We see a similar prophetic statement made in Genesis 25:23, where God tells the pregnant Rebekah that she has “two nations” in her womb. Obviously, this doesn’t mean that she was literally pregnant with two nations, but rather with two future family lines (Walton, Matthews, & Chavalas, 2000, pp. 57-58) represented by her eventual children Esau and Jacob.

[53] Grudem also notes that scientific studies have shown that fetuses are able to hear and respond to sounds and voices while in the womb, which he says is consistent with Luke 1’s account that the fetus “leaped for joy” at the sound of Mary’s voice (Grudem, 2020, p. 12). However, a review of his references reveals that all of the studies that he cites concern fetuses developed well into the third trimester of pregnancy. Again, at most this could support banning elective third trimester abortions, not ones done before such time.

[54] The evidence for this is Paul’s cryptic reference to himself as an ektróma (“one untimely born,” “abortion,” or “miscarriage”) in 1 Corinthians 15:8. The term was understood by early Christian authors to be “a metaphor for something or someone not yet fully formed” in the spiritual sense of “not yet ‘formed’ or redeemed by the Saviour (Christ)” (Hollander & van der Hout, 1996, p. 233). This notion is in line with the Septuagint reading of Exodus 21:22-25, and Paul’s use of the word suggests that he understood this concept as well. For further discussion on this point, see Kamitsuka (2019, pp. 24-29).

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