Dilemmas of Self-Condemnation in Traditional Christianity and Islam

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Introduction
1. The Antinatalist
2. The Abortionist Physician
3. The Negligent Physician
4. The Religious Politician
5. The Older Sibling
6. The World Emperor
7. The Question of Repentance
8. The Scientist
9. The Missionary
10. Donations to Charity
11. A Small Remark
Conclusion

Introduction

Both Christianity and Islam emphasize individual salvation. In this article, I aim to demonstrate that, assuming the truth of salvific exclusivism and the reality of eternal, conscious torment, there are several scenarios—some more hypothetical, others more realistic—in which a person faces the dilemma of choosing between avoiding their own damnation or preventing the damnation of many other souls. Such situations reveal an existential dilemma and horror in which anguishing choices may become necessary to minimize the eternal suffering of others. I will also address some actions that, counterintuitively, become desirable in this scenario.

1. The Antinatalist

I will begin with the case of the antinatalist. This is a case I have already analyzed in another text.[1] I decided to write it again to gather all the self-condemnation dilemmas I have encountered in a single text and also to issue a personal retraction: due to my ignorance, I ended up in a middle ground between the publication of that previous text and the present one, discovering a detail of Islamic theology that seems to remove from Islam the antinatalist self-condemnation dilemma. The theological detail consists of the interpretation of the following passage from the Qur’an:

Surah Al-A’raf 7:172-173: “And [remember] when your Lord took from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them testify concerning themselves, [saying], ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They said, ‘Yes, we testify’—lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘Indeed, we were of this unaware.'”

There are several interpretations of this passage[2], but the most popular interpretation among Muslims is that God created, in some manner (for example, from Adam’s loins), all the people who would exist throughout human history, all at once. Thus, no matter what measures humans take, there exists an immutable number of pre-created humans who, one way or another, will be born. It seems to me that this renders any antinatalist effort to avoid creating the existential risk of going to Hell useless.

With this clarification made, although there may be Muslims who reject the doctrine of the preexistence of souls, I will focus on Christianity, where the doctrine of preexistence is widely considered heretical, aside from possible marginal cases of this doctrine within Christianity.

Within Christianity, both a biblical interpretation and the Orthodox tradition show that children are a blessing from God, and thus something desirable:

• Psalms 127:3-5: “Children are a heritage from the LORD, offspring a reward from him. Like arrows in the hands of a warrior are children born in one’s youth. Blessed is the man whose quiver is full of them!”
• Proverbs 17:6: “Children’s children are a crown to the aged, and parents are the pride of their children.”
• Genesis 33:5: “Then Esau asked, ‘Who are these with you?’ And Jacob said, ‘These are the children God has graciously given your servant.'”
• Proverbs 22:6: “Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it.”
• Psalms 113:9: “He gives the barren woman a home, making her the joyous mother of children. Hallelujah!”

Thus, an antinatalist—someone who considers procreation immoral or imprudent, even an existential antinatalist (one who is antinatalist for non-moral reasons)—cannot, we can affirm, be a true Christian.

However, if we consider a scenario in which traditional Christianity is true—assuming that these forms of the religion hold as truths the salvific exclusivism and eternal torment for non-believers—we have the following scenario when considering the possibility of someone having children, both for the individual in question and when analyzing the situation of a third party:

1. The person has a child, the child believes in the true religion, and goes to Heaven.
2. The person has a child, the child does not believe in the true religion, and goes to eternal torment.
3. The person has no children, and thus there is no one to go to Heaven, but also no one to go to eternal torment.

Thus, if a person finds it desirable to minimize suffering—even regarding hypothetical individuals—they should logically agree with antinatalism, considering it preferable that neither they nor others have children.

The dilemma can be expressed in this reasoning, considering a scenario where traditional Christianity is true:

1. If a person is rational, believes in salvific exclusivism and eternal torment, and wishes to minimize suffering, then they are an antinatalist.
2. If someone is a true Christian, then they are not an antinatalist.
3. This person is an antinatalist.
4. Therefore, they are not truly Christian.
5. Whoever is not a true Christian is condemned to eternal torment.
6. Therefore, this person is condemned to eternal torment.

One might reject premise 1 by arguing, for some reason, that we should not always minimize suffering—perhaps claiming that the chances of the descendant going to Heaven compensate for the existential risk. In that case, the argument breaks at premise 1. However, an inescapable fact is that, very likely, within a few generations—whether in the case of this person or a third party—it is highly probable that at least one descendant will go to Hell; the reason being that a parent cannot fully control their children’s beliefs, much less control their descendants’ beliefs through legacy up to the tenth generation. The scenario is even worse if we are talking about someone living in an area where the true religion is a minority, or if the person’s beliefs are the wrong beliefs and not the true religion—for example, a Protestant Christian in a universe where Catholic Christianity is true.

We can observe that this argument does not only apply to married people who can have children, because even if we consider someone who remains single and celibate, the argument still holds: if they meet all the requirements of premise 1, they are an antinatalist and desire that others also do not have children—a desire that goes directly against the precepts of Christianity—and from this point, the rest of the argument follows.

2. The Abortionist Physician

In traditional Christianity and Islam—disregarding more liberal strands—abortion, in most cases, is considered unethical, a sin. Someone who commits such a sin and does not repent will be condemned to eternal torment.

Taking this into consideration, let us analyze a scenario where traditional Christianity or Islam is true and consider the situation of a certain physician who works in a hospital or clinic and repeatedly has the chance to perform abortions.

Assume that legislation allows him to refuse to perform abortions due to the right to conscientious objection. Thus, we have these scenarios, considering that the fetus in question, if not aborted, will grow to at least adulthood, and also considering that it is traditionally understood within these religions that aborted fetuses go unconditionally to Heaven:

1. The fetus in question is not aborted, accepts the true religion, and goes to Heaven.
2. The fetus is not aborted, does not accept the true religion, and goes to eternal torment.
3. The fetus is aborted and goes to Heaven.

If the physician wishes to minimize the chances of suffering, the most rational action would be to perform the abortion; however, since abortion is a sin, the physician faces the following dilemma:

1. Abort, thus preventing the aborted fetus from going to eternal torment, but the physician is condemned to eternal torment.
2. Do not abort, thus remaining saved, but maintaining the existential risk that the non-aborted fetus might be condemned to eternal torment.

So far, the scenario has been analyzed in a geographically neutral manner, but when we consider geography there are even worse scenarios. For instance, consider a scenario where Christianity is true, and a Christian physician working in a hospital, who repeatedly has the chance to perform abortions, is specifically in Japan—where the majority of the population is non-Christian. Each time the physician is faced with the choice of performing or not performing an abortion, the scenario described above is worsened:

1. Abort, thus preventing the aborted fetus from going to eternal torment, but the physician is condemned to eternal torment.
2. Do not abort, thus remaining saved, but very likely the non-aborted fetus, if it grows to adulthood, will not convert to the true religion, which in this scenario is Christianity.

This scenario applies to any analysis that considers geographic locations where the “true religion” is a minority.

3. The Negligent Physician

In a case similar to that of the abortionist physician, imagine a scenario where Islam is true and a Muslim physician must perform a necessary surgery to keep a small child alive. This child lives in a place where most people are non-Muslim, including the child’s parents. The physician faces the following dilemma:

1. Save the child, and this child will very likely grow up and not accept Islam, thus being condemned to eternal torment.
2. Do not save the child—perhaps deliberately committing a fatal medical error, thereby becoming a murderer—but the child will go to Heaven.

If the physician proceeds as in scenario 2 and does not repent, he is condemned to eternal torment. The issue of repentance will be considered later in this article.

4. The Religious Politician

This scenario shares some similarities with the case of the abortionist physician, as it also focuses on the issue of abortion. Consider that Islam is true, and there is a politician—a lawmaker—who is Muslim but lives in a country where Muslims are a minority, and he is in the situation of voting on the legalization of abortion for a wide variety of cases—not only those involving the life or health of the mother, which are cases where Islam permits abortion. Suppose this politician’s vote is decisive in the voting process; he faces the following dilemma:

1. Vote in favor of legalizing abortion, so that many fetuses are aborted thanks to the law and thus go to Heaven; however, by voting in favor, he is condemned to eternal torment.
2. Vote against the legalization of abortion, thus remaining saved, but likely many fetuses will not be aborted due to the marginalization of abortion practices and will grow up not accepting the true religion and thus go to eternal torment.

This dilemma also occurs in cases of laws involving embryonic stem cell research, since embryos are considered to have a soul, and embryonic research destroys the embryo.

This dilemma also applies to heads of state in some countries where, every time a law passes through parliament and is about to come into effect, their sanction is required, as well as to supreme court judges who are considering whether an abortion law is constitutional.

One might argue that abortion occurs regardless of whether the law permits it, and that the number of abortions does not change with its legalization; however, a law prohibiting abortion may prevent, in some cases, an abortion from taking place—for example, medical professionals in a clinic or hospital who work within the law, when confronted by a pregnant woman who wishes to have an abortion under circumstances not permitted by law, will refuse to perform the abortion, thus keeping the dilemma valid.

5. The Older Sibling

In this other scenario, consider that Islam is correct; a 19-year-old, raised in a devout Christian family in a predominantly Christian country, becomes convinced that Islam is true. This young man has a younger sibling, who is 4 years old. Considering that, according to Islam, children who die very young go to Heaven, the young man faces the following dilemma:

1. Kill his younger sibling, preventing him from being condemned to eternal torment; however, the young man is condemned to eternal torment.
2. Do not kill his younger sibling, thus remaining saved; however, it is very likely that his younger sibling will be condemned to eternal torment.

Regarding scenario 2, consider that since it is a devout Christian family, the younger sibling will be raised as a Christian, and the parents will not allow the older sibling to have much influence over his religious beliefs. Moreover, since they live in a predominantly Christian country, it is very likely that his younger sibling will become Christian, being in this scenario condemned to eternal torment.

6. The World Emperor

This case is, in a way, a summary of the previous cases; consider that traditional Christianity is true, and that there exists a world emperor who has total control over the world, complete control over the laws, and an invincible, completely loyal army, and this emperor is Christian.

The emperor, upon realizing all these existential dilemmas, despairs and decides to take the following measures: compulsory sterilization of everyone in the world, compulsory abortion for all pregnant women, destruction of all embryos used in assisted reproduction technologies (such as in vitro fertilization), and infanticide—killing all children below a certain age, the so-called age of reason, at which children who die before reaching it go unconditionally to Heaven.

Furthermore, he creates a kind of human zygote factory, where every day millions of zygotes are artificially created and then incinerated.

With these actions, he prevents billions of hypothetical souls and billions of real souls from being condemned to eternal torment, but after his death, due to these actions, he is condemned to eternal torment. Had he not taken these actions, he would not have been condemned, but billions of souls would have been condemned to eternal torment.

7. The Question of Repentance

In all these scenarios, one might raise the objection that a person could repent and thus not be condemned; however, these religions require sincere repentance, which implies many changes in the individual.

To repent for having committed the sinful acts that prevented other people from going to eternal torment, the individual would have to completely change their way of thinking—they would have to no longer seek to minimize the risk of suffering, considering that some things are superior to this. Additionally, they would have to think that, in a counterfactual scenario, it would have been better if they had not committed the acts they did, which means that they would implicitly or explicitly believe that it would have been better for the people they prevented from being condemned to eternal torment to run the risk of being condemned to eternal torment. All of this implies a radical change in the individual’s mindset.

8. The Scientist

This scenario may be considered not as a dilemma but as an action that counterintuitively should be avoided. Both Christianity and Islam consider that people with severe congenital mental disabilities will go to Heaven because they lack the intellectual capacity to make the decisions involved in spiritual life. Suppose that Christianity is correct, and that there is a scientist who has discovered a treatment that cures a certain severe intellectual disability. In this scenario:

1. If the scientist disseminates his treatment, very likely some of the people who are cured will not become Christians and will go to eternal torment.
2. The scientist does not disseminate his treatment, halts the research before finding the cure, or does not even start the research; thus, all people with that particular severe intellectual disability, when they die, will go to Heaven.

This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that the best thing to do in a scenario where traditional Christianity and Islam are true is not to research the cure for severe intellectual disabilities—that is, humanity should refrain from seeking the cure for these disabilities.

We can go further; in fact, this applies to all research into cures for diseases that afflict at least children below the so-called “age of reason.” For example, let us assume that Christianity is true and that a scientist discovers a cure for a certain cancer. Among the thousands of people cured, there would be several thousand children—and many of these children live in predominantly non-Christian countries. Consider these scenarios:

1. The children remain uncured, die at a young age, and go to Heaven.
2. The children are cured, many of them grow up to become non-Christians, and when they die, they are condemned to eternal torment.

Thus, it would be better not to discover the cure for this cancer, since with the cure, many people will go to eternal torment, whereas without the cure, those people would go to Heaven. This applies to any other disease that, as mentioned before, afflicts young children.

9. The Missionary

This is a classic scenario[3]: consider that people who have never heard about Christianity or Islam—depending on which scenario we are considering—might have less rigorous criteria for being saved, might have a clearer special revelation than the religious confusion that exists in the world, or perhaps they would all be saved. Whatever the criteria for salvation, it is easier to be saved without having been evangelized than to be evangelized. Consider the situation of a missionary who wants to evangelize an isolated tribe, and the missionary’s religion is true:

1. Some members of the tribe accept the “true religion” and others do not.
2. All members of the tribe accept the “true religion.”
3. The missionary does not evangelize them, and thus they continue to have less rigorous criteria for salvation.

Scenario 2 is the best scenario, but it is very risky to assume it will materialize. For example, it may be that in the state of ignorance regarding the true religion, all members of the tribe were being saved by the criterion that everyone who does not know about the true religion is saved, or by some similar criterion—perhaps criteria based on practices and beliefs. For example, some Christians might argue that if an isolated tribe is monotheistic and does not engage in any horrible practices such as human sacrifice and cannibalism, these people are saved. However, this missionary decides to evangelize, confident in scenario 2, and what happens is scenario 1, where some do not believe him; thus, people who were saved before become condemned to eternal torment.

One might argue that the missionary has a moral duty to evangelize the tribe, but this, along with what has already been said, generates yet another scenario of self-condemnation. Furthermore, the scenario worsens if the missionary holds a mistaken belief—for example, a Christian missionary in a scenario where Islam is true.

Evangelization is only rational if the people of the tribe are already condemned; for instance, if it is true that all those who do not believe in the true religion—even if they had never heard of it—are condemned to eternal torment, or if the criteria for salvation for those who have not heard the gospel are to be monotheistic and not practice any horrible things such as human sacrifice and cannibalism, and the tribe in question is polytheistic and practices human sacrifice and cannibalism.

10. Donations to Charity

Another counterintuitive scenario is regarding donations to charity. Many people donate to humanitarian causes, such as helping war refugees, combating disease and hunger in poor countries, donating to research on diseases, among other causes. However, consider that traditional Christianity is true, and someone donates an amount of money that was crucial to saving the life of a child in a country where the majority of the population is not Christian, and this child grows up and becomes non-Christian, and after they die, they are condemned to eternal torment; and consider that in a counterfactual scenario, if that person had not made the donation, the child would have died and gone to Heaven.

Another similar scenario, considering scenario 8 already addressed, is of someone who makes a donation that helps in research to develop a cure for a certain severe congenital intellectual disability, and many of the cured individuals end up not accepting the true religion and are condemned to eternal torment, while if the person had not donated, the research would not have succeeded, and those people would eventually go to Heaven after dying.

Thus, we reach the counterintuitive conclusion that it is better not to make certain donations in scenarios where traditional Christianity or Islam were true.

11. A Small Remark

Some of these dilemmas are based on the fact that aborted fetuses, children who die young, and people with intellectual disabilities are certainly saved — this is true in Islam[4] through the concept of fitrah[5]—but there is a minority belief in Christianity, found in figures such as Augustine of Hippo, according to which these individuals (or some of them) are nevertheless condemned. If that view is correct, then some of these dilemmas do not work, but it should be noted that it seems questionable to call a deity who condemns small children omnibenevolent and worthy of worship.

Conclusion

Taking into account everything that has been discussed, it has been demonstrated that the salvific exclusivism of a given religion, along with the eternal torment for non-believers (if true), generates a wide variety of existential dilemmas in which one must choose between sacrificing one’s own soul to an eternity of torment or watching other people—often family members, as in the case of the older sibling—be condemned to eternal torment. This demonstrates an extreme and absurd existential horror of these conceptions of reality, which can be summarized in the following macabre phrase: “If you don’t have children, don’t have them; if you are pregnant, abort; if you have small children, kill them.”

Notes

[1] Reinhard von Richter, “The Paradox of Self-Condemnation in a Christian or Muslim Universe” (December 25, 2024). The Secular Web. <https://infidels.org/kiosk/article/paradox-of-self-condemnation>

[2] Wadad Kadi (Al-Qadi), “Primordial Covenant: Human History in the Qur’an.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 147, No. 4 (December 2003): 332-338. <https://www.aub.edu.lb/fas/jewett-chair/Documents/primordial-convenant-human-history-in-qur’an-al-qadi.pdf>

[3] Annie Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 123.

[4] Aal-e-Qutub Aal-e-Syed Abdullah Shah Ghazi, “Explanation of the Hadith: “Every Child is Born on Al-Fitrah” (June 13, 2019). Aal-e-Qutub Aal-e-Syed Abdullah Shah Ghazi—Correct Islamic Faith. <https://aalequtub.com/2019/06/13/explanation-of-the-hadith-every-child-is-born-on-al-fitrah/>

[5] Yasien Mohamed, Fitrah: The Islamic Concept of Human Nature (London, UK: Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996).