(2025)
Introduction
The Fundamentals of Legal Apologetics (Chapter 1)
The Jewish Trial of Jesus (Chapter 2)
The Roman Trial of Jesus (Chapter 3)
Conclusion
Review: Matt Vega. 2018. A Lawyer Looks at the Trials of Jesus: Using Legal Apologetics to Defend the Gospel Story. Parkersburg, WV: Warren Christian Apologetics Center. 146 pp.
Introduction
Attorney Matt Vega claims that he uses legal apologetics to defend the Gospel story, but he has an unusual definition of legal apologetics. His book has three chapters, only one of which deals with traditional legal apologetics.
Vega is quite correct when he points out that there is no definitive classification for categories of Christian apologetics. Even so, it is safe to say that legal apologetics is a type of evidential apologetics, as opposed to presuppositional or experiential apologetics. Evidential apologetics stresses the need for evidence in support of Christian truth claims. Jesus’ Resurrection is the number one truth claim evidential apologists claim they can prove—most often from the viewpoint of a historian. Gary Habermas, Michael Licona, and Josh McDowell are prominent evidential apologists.
Legal apologists claim that they can prove the Resurrection with “Testimony scrubbed and polished by the limitations of the rules of evidence used to test truth claims in a federal court of law in the United States today.”[1] It would certainly be impressive if legal apologists could actually do that because history has no binding or agreed-upon rules of evidence.[2] Using legal rules of evidence adds a degree of order and respectability to an otherwise haphazard endeavor.
However, courts test truth claims in adversary proceedings in which opposing parties can object to other parties’ evidence. Vega and other would-be legal apologists cannot engage in real legal arguments without a real opponent, and I have volunteered to be that opposing counsel. On April 25, 2025, I invited/challenged Vega or his publisher, Warren Christian Apologetics Center, to respond to my unopposed brief challenging legal apologetics, but neither has responded.
Vega’s book has three chapters:
Chapter 1. The Fundamentals of Legal Apologetics
Chapter 2. The Jewish Trial of Jesus
Chapter 3. The Roman Trial of Jesus
In these three chapters, Vega asserts that there are at least four distinct ways legal apologetics are employed.
“First is the use of legal analogies or metaphors.” For example, in the Old Testament God is pictured as the judge (Genesis 18:25). The Bible certainly uses metaphors and other literary devices, but they are not relevant to apologetics, legal or otherwise. Vega does not make any argument based on this type of legal apologetics.
Second, “historical legal apologetics” attempts to reconstruct and apply first century legal standards to determine how the evidence would have been perceived by a first century audience. Vega discusses this argument in the second and third chapters of the book.
Third, Vega identifies “a more ‘technical’ juridical mode of apologetics closely associated with Simon Greenleaf.” This is traditional legal apologetics. Vega discusses this argument in the first chapter of the book.
Fourth, Vega describes “a more philosophical approach” based on natural law. Lawyers in real courts rarely cite philosophers as authority on legal issues. Vega does not make any argument based on this type of legal apologetics.
The Fundamentals of Legal Apologetics (Chapter 1)
Vega begins Chapter 1 with a short history of traditional legal apologetics from The Truth of the Christian Religion by Hugo Grotius in 1627 up to the present day. Vega then discusses a hotchpotch of the usual augments made by legal apologists. I addressed most of these arguments in a previous paper and will not rehash them here. However, I did not discuss John Warwick Montgomery’s use of the parol evidence rule. Montgomery sets out his most detailed discussion of his argument in a short pamphlet.[3] I will now cover the subject as an example of the sort of reasoning found in The Trials of Jesus.
Not to be snarky, but Vega, a graduate of Yale Law School and a current professor of business law, should really know how to spell the parol evidence rule. Vega explains:
John Warwick Montgomery uses the Parole [sic] Evidence Rule to argue by analogy the text of the Bible must be allowed to interpret itself (cf. The Law Above the Law 87.)[4] The legal rule states external evidence of prior negotiations (called “parole [sic] evidence”) cannot be used to contradict what is written in executed written instruments such as legal contracts and wills (cf. Legal). The New Testament is a new covenant (contract) between God and His people (Hebrews 8:8, 13) and the last will and testament of Christ (Hebrews 9:15-17). Therefore, by analogy, the Parole [sic] Evidence Rule may be extended to the New Testament and would preclude allowing extrinsic evidence to alter the nature of the gospels.
The most obvious problem with this assertion is that no “prior negotiations” preceded the Gospels. To the best of my knowledge no one has ever tried to use “extrinsic evidence of prior negotiations” to “alter the nature of the gospels.”
Likewise, the New Testament cannot be both a contract and a will. Contracts and wills are different things. Although both have similar rules of construction, the parol evidence rule applies only to contracts and different rules apply to wills. For contracts, the court attempts to discern the intent of the parties as set out in the final contract. For wills, the court tries determine the intent of the testator from the language of the will and the circumstances surrounding its execution.
If the New Testament is a contract “between God and His people,” then who conducted the “prior negotiations” for “His people?” If there were no negotiations, then the contract is a contract of adhesion—a contract in which the parties are of such disproportionate bargaining power that the party of weaker bargaining strength could not have negotiated for variations in the terms of the adhesion contract. Had anyone ask for my opinion I might have suggested that the contract should clarify whether babies go to Hell.
If the New Testament is the last will and testament of Christ, then we should attempt to determine Jesus’ intent from the language of the “will” and the circumstances surrounding its execution. However, this does not jibe with other legal apologetic arguments.
Legal apologists, including Vega and Montgomery, base their case on the alleged testimony of fact witnesses—mainly 1 Corinthians 15:3-8 and the Gospels. Although there may be some question about the kind of appearance Paul meant in 1 Corinthians (vision or corporeal), the Gospel authors certainly intended to say Jesus rose from the dead. Issue is whether to believe them, and the parol evidence does not say anything about credibility. Comparing the New Testament to contracts and wills is simply not a good analogy.
The Jewish Trial of Jesus (Chapter 2)
Vega critiques the Jewish and Roman trials of Jesus in chapters 2 and 3. Vega spills a lot of ink defending Biblical inerrancy, and he has an appendix with a color coded harmonization of the four Gospels.
He makes a good case that Jesus got a raw deal at trial, but how does that prove the resurrection? According to Vega, it means that Jesus is the Son of God, but he never clearly explains his reasoning, if any.
The Roman Trial of Jesus (Chapter 3)
In chapter 3 (Roman trial), Vega cites Luke 23:13-16 in which Pilate found that Jesus had done nothing to deserve death. He argues that under modern law double jeopardy would bar Jesus’ crucifixion. This is rather like judging a horse race by NASCAR rules. Some rules may be analogous, but they are two different systems. In any event, Vega never explains how double jeopardy somehow proves the Resurrection.
Conclusion
Vega argues in his conclusion that he has identified twenty-five legal errors in Jesus’ Jewish and Roman trials, and these errors prove “[t]hey clearly executed an innocent man.” This logic is flawed because any number of legal errors would not prove actual innocence. Jesus would need to introduce his own evidence to prove his innocence, and He famously declined to defend Himself.
Vega further reasons that these twenty-five legal errors prove that Jesus was the Son of God for three reasons.
First, Vega claims that “these events were the fulfillment of prophecies” and it would be “statistically impossible” for a mere mortal to have done so. Numerous writers have made or debunked this statistical argument.
Second, Vega claims that “these events must be reconciled with what Jesus claims about Himself.” He argues that Jesus made predictions and performed miracles while claiming to be divine. Old Testament prophets made predications and the apostles performed miracles, but only Jesus did these things while claiming to be divine. This begs the question of whether Jesus actually performed miracles. If you start with the assumption that Jesus performed miracles, then it is easy to conclude that he was what he claimed to be.
Third, multiple independent eyewitness sources confirm Jesus’ trial, crucifixion, and resurrection. I have addressed this claim elsewhere.
Conspicuous by its absence from these three reasons is any clue as to how the twenty-five legal errors prove that Jesus is the Son of God. Vega spends three quarters of his book critiquing the Jewish and Roman trials of Jesus and repeatedly promises that he will show how legal errors will prove Jesus divinity. However, he never explains any reason why the violations of Jesus’ rights establish his membership in the Trinity.
In sum, A Lawyer Looks at the Trials of Jesus has only a superficial discussion of traditional legal apologetics, and its analysis of Jesus’ trials never makes a point.
Notes
[1] Pamela Binnings Ewen, Faith on Trial (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 2013), p. 7.
[2] Michael Grant, in Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010), p. 100.
[3] John Warwick Montgomery, Law & Gospel, A Study Integrating Law and Practice (Edmonton, Canada: Canadian Institute for Law, Theology & Public Policy, 1994), pp. 23-26.
[4] John Warwick Montgomery, Law Above the Law (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 1975), pp. 87-88.
Copyright ©2025 by Robert G. Miller. This electronic version is copyright ©2025 by Internet Infidels, Inc. with the permission of Robert G. Miller. All rights reserved.