Naturalism, Free Choices, and Conscious Experiences (2007) Andrew Melnyk 1. The Kind of Naturalism in Question 2. Free Choices 3. The Fact That the Universe Contains Conscious Mental States As I understand them, Charles Taliaferro and Stewart Goetz (hereafter, TG) are best viewed as making two main objections to a certain kind of naturalism. In […]
Physicalism and the First-Person Point of View: A Reply to Taliaferro and Goetz (2007) Andrew Melnyk In my paper, “A Case for Physicalism about the Human Mind,” I didn’t attempt to defend physicalism about human mentality (henceforth, just physicalism) against the many objections that philosophers, and others, have made to it. Instead, I tried to […]
A Case for Physicalism about the Human Mind (2007) Andrew Melnyk 1. What Is Physicalism about the Human Mind? 2. Physicalism about the Human Mind and Theism 3. Some Evidence for Physicalism about the Human Mind 3.1 An Enumerative Induction 3.2 Evidence from the Neural Dependence of Mental Phenomena 4. An Antiphysicalist Response In this […]