2015 Internet Infidels Fundraising Drive / $31,100.00 of $40,000.00
Support Us! By providing information which is nearly impossible to find elsewhere, the Secular Web has sought to level the playing field by offering arguments and evidence challenging supernatural beliefs. In an ocean of religious confusion, help us maintain a drop of sanity!

Arnold T. Guminski

Author Bio ]

A Critical Examination of Mark R. Nowacki's Novel Version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (2008)

This article examines Nowicki's novel version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (N-KCA), and finds it seriously flawed. The N-KCA purportedly shows the factual impossibility of a denumerably infinite set of coexisting concrete entities; and that there would be such a set were an infinite temporal series of events to obtain because each existing substance bears its own necessarily permanent temporal marks and those of its ancestors. Nowicki, professing the A-theory of time, nevertheless maintains that truth-makers of past-event propositions are not tensed facts, according to some correspondence theory of truth, but rather the temporal marks borne by existing substances.

A Critique of the Plantinga Version of the Modal Ontological Argument (2015) (Off Site)

In this paper I examine the modal ontological argument based upon possible worlds semantics expounded by Alvin Plantinga (the Plantinga Modal Ontological Argument or PMOA), and as further developed and defended by William Lane Craig. In part A I set forth the definitions and premises of the PMOA and its conclusions, and disclose its flawed underlying assumptions. In part B, I expound and defend what I call the "Anti-Plantinga Modal Ontological Argument-Argument" (Anti-PMOA-Argument). I thereby rigorously show that despite appearances a maximally great being is not broadly logically possible. In part C I set forth why the Anti-PMOA-Argument is amply confirmed because the procedure followed in the construction of the PMOA plausibly allows the construction of arguments relevantly similar to but inconsistent with it. Such rival arguments show either the existence in all possible worlds of beings relevantly similar to but different from that of god conceived as a maximally excellent being (as defined in the PMOA)—or, what is more striking, the existence in all possible worlds of several conceivable maximally excellent beings that nevertheless constitutively or otherwise differ from each other in some important respects. Part D Is devoted to an examination of the nature of the modality involved in possible world semantics. In so doing, the paper explains why the notion of what is broadly logically possible/necessary ought to be distinguished from the notion of what is metaphysically possible/necessary. Part E considers the plausibility of premise 1 of the PMOA (i.e., it is possible that a maximally great being exists) found in the writings of other scholars.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Set of Real Entities (2003; updated 2014)

According to a form of the kalam cosmological argument expounded by William Lane Craig, there cannot be a beginningless temporal world because the application of Cantorian set theory of transfinite arithmetic to the real world generates counterintuitive absurdities, thereby disclosing that an infinite set of real entities is metaphysically impossible. This article shows how this is not the case by pursuing a novel approach wherein it is understood that an infinite set of real entities is not a set, considered as a technical term of art, within the meaning of Cantorian theory. Upon accepting the original version for publication, Quentin Smith, then editor of Philo, wrote: "Your paper has been studied thoroughly for some time and there is agreement that it is at least an undercutting defeater of [William Lane] Craig's beliefs about real infinites, probably even an overriding defeater. More importantly, it introduces a novel metaphysical theory of the relation of transfinite arithmetic to concrete reality." Guminski's persuasive challenge to Craig's account of why Cantorian transfinite arithmetic should not be deemed to apply to the world of concrete entities has yet to be answered by Craig. The world wonders.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument Yet Again: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Temporal Series (2003; revised 2014)

Arnold T. Guminski's "The Kalam Cosmological Argument: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Set of Real Entities" showed that the argument by William Lane Craig and others that real infinites are metaphysically impossible presupposes the standard version (SV) of how Cantorian set theory presumably applies to the real world. This is the case because it is the application of SV to the real world which generates counterintuitive absurdities. However, there Guminski also showed that there is an alternative version (AV) of applying Cantorian set theory to the real world, the application of which does not generate counterintuitive absurdities. In the present paper he shows that given AV, an infinite temporal series is metaphysically possible, producing a result that should be equally satisfying to both theists and nontheists who are loath to believe that a beginningless temporal world is metaphysically impossible. However much theists and nontheists may disagree about other issues, they are at least able to agree upon one important thing: the kalam cosmological argument fails insofar as it is grounded upon the alleged metaphysical impossibility of an infinite temporal series.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument as Amended: The Question of the Metaphysical Possibility of an Infinite Temporal Series of Finite Duration (2004, updated 2005)

In this third paper about the kalam cosmological argument (KCA), Guminski shows how William Lane Craig has developed a mutated form of the argument such that it presupposes the metaphysical possibility of an infinite temporal series of finite duration. The Kalam Cosmological Argument As Amended (KCAAA) thus contradicts a key component of the KCA: that any infinite temporal series is metaphysically impossible. The KCAAA relies upon the Standard Big Bang Model as providing the supposed factual basis for concluding that the universe has a finite but indefinite past, thus involving an infinite temporal series of finite duration. Guminski argues why there is good reason to hold that any infinite temporal series of finite duration is metaphysically impossible given the A-theory of time, absolute simultaneity, and some complementary doctrines--assumptions that Craig accepts. Given these assumptions, however, the KCAAA fails.

The Moral Argument for God's Existence, the Natural Moral Law, and Conservative Metaphysical Naturalism (2004) (Off Site):
PDF Download
HTML (Click on "Media," then on "Papers.")

This is an expanded version of a lecture for the University of Colorado Theology Forum in which Guminski proposes to show why the moral argument for God's existence is unsound. Particular attention is given to the writings of J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Paul Copan.

The Scope and the Limits of the Church's Inherent Coercive Power (2014) (Off Site) (with Brian W. Harrison)

Some mistakenly hold that the Catholic Church's declaration on religious freedom issued in 1965 (the Dignitatis Humanae) is consistent with the idea that the Church has the power to either directly impose temporal penalties typically imposed by civil authority only, and/or to indirectly do so by requiring civil authority to act as her secular arm under penalty of ecclesiastical sanction (i.e., excommunication, deposition of the offending civil ruler, or release of subjects from their duty of allegiance). In this exploration of the extent to which the coercive authority of any church or society is compatible with internationally recognized religious freedom, Arnold T. Guminski (an old atheist) with Brian W. Harrison (a Catholic priest) argues that the Catholic Church's inherent coercive power over its members does not extend to the imposition or use of temporal penalties typical of civil authorities only. Instead, its acquired coercive power to do so obtained solely by virtue of: (a) the jus publicum of Catholic Christendom in the medieval era and for some time thereafter, (b) the discretionary delegation or grant of power by the secular authority; (c) customary law by which the Church acted as civil authority because of exigencies that arose during a period of severe political and social disorder; or (d) because of an influential but nonmagisterial theory, appealing to the power of the keys, regarding the Church's inherent power over temporal matters in a Catholic State. The latter theory never formerly constituted part of the authoritative doctrine of the Church. (For a more detailed abstract, click on the "Info" button at the top of the essay.)